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'NGOS IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES' PROJECT
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RWANDA REPORT:

INTERNATIONAL NGOS IN THE RESPONSE TO THE RWANDAN EMERGENCY

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADRA	Adventist Development Relief Agency
AHAT	(UN) Advance Humanitarian Assistance Team
AICF	Action Internationale Contre le Faim
ARC	American Rescue Committee
CARE	Concerned Americans for Relief Everywhere
CD	Country Director
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CEPGL	Communité Economique de Pays des Grands Lacs
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DHA	(UN) Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DMZ	De-militarized Zone
DPKO	(UN) Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ENVD	Eduction for Non-Violence and Democracy
FAO	(UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
FIDH	Federation International de Droits Humaine
HEWS	Humanitarian Early Warning System
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC[RCS]	nternational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMC	International Medical Corps
INGO	International non-governmental organisations
IOM	International Office of Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MdM	Médecins du Monde
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
MRND	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
MSF(B/F/S/H)	Médecins Sans Frontières/(BelgiumFrance/Spain/Holland)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Administration [UK]
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [of USAID]
PSF	Pharmaciens sans Frontières [Pharmacists without Borders]
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SitRep	Situation Report
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Misison in Rwanda
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Childrens Fund
UNREO	United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program
ZCSO	Zairian Camp Security Operation

EXECUTIVESUMMARY [1]

This report, commissioned as part of a comparative study of the role of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in complex emergencies, examines certain themes in the role of international development and relief NGOs in the lead up and response to the Rwandan genocide in the summer of 1994. These themes are: the capacity of INGOs to forestall complex political emergencies; their role in providing early warning of forthcoming emergencies and drawing international attention to them; their role in mapping the development of emergencies, once underway; their operational response to such emergencies; and the ethical, security, and political dilemmas that such emergencies produce. Attention is also paid to the question of state failure and state collapse - complex concepts which apply in various measure to different elements of the events in Rwanda.

Three episodes related to the emergency are considered in depth. First, to capture the question of early warning of, drawing attention to, and forestalling complex emergencies before they come into being, it was decided to examine INGO response to the crisis of February/March 1993, when ca. 400,000 people fled their homes in the face of a major rebel offensive. Second, to capture both mapping and operational response issues, and because of the sheer scale and importance of it, the massive influx of refugees into Goma, Zaire in July 1994 is treated as a focal point.[2] The third focus of investigation is the security problems and ethical dilemmas encountered by INGOs while delivering aid to refugees in Zaire. To

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[1] This report was read in draft form by a number of colleagues, for whose comments I am grateful. Responsibility for errors rests with the author. A large number of NGO and UN staff members with nothing to gain from doing so gave unstintingly of their time, experience, and expertise to help me produce this report: I owe them all a debt of gratitude, and hope that some of them find value in this report and the wider project. The author would like to thank, in particular, Jude Rand, Rowland Roome, Emery Brusset, Jean-Marc Mangin, Kevin McCort, Beverly Neufeld, Lindsey Hillsum, and Anne Lloyd-Williams, as well as other members of the project team, for invaluable assistance in the production of this report or commentary on early drafts. A large number of NGOs and UN agencies made both files and staff members available, and facilitated various aspects of the author's field visits to the region: particular thanks (in chronological order) to OXFAM UK, CARE Kenya, CONCERN (Nairobi), CARE Rwanda., and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (Nairobi.) Special thanks to Risper Oliech and Hillary Muskoya, and the rest of the staff of CARE Kenya, for providing me a friendly base in Nairobi; and to Rowland Roome and the staff of CARE Rwanda for help, hospitality, and good humour - and for putting up with yet another visiting consultant - during my visit to Rwanda. Thanks to Aidan Hartley, formerly Reuters Rebel Correspondent for East Africa, for invaluable discussions about the Rwandan civil war, a place to stay, and a few drinks too many; and in particular to Anne Macintosh, formerly of OXFAM in Rwanda, for reading drafts, saving me from embarrasing errors, supplying critical documents, and giving frequently of her time, experience, and commitment. This report is dedicated to the numerous development and relief workers and journalists I met whose courage and commitment to Rwanda through the worst of times stands in eloquent response to many recent attacks on the professionalism and commitment of the humanitarian and media communities.

[2] A similar influx of refugees into Ngara, Tanzania in May 1994 was also considered, but it was decided that the issues presented by Ngara were present as well in Goma, and Goma had relevant complexities that Ngara did not - principally in the weakness of the Zairian state authority relative to that of Tanzania.

narrow this very large topic, this section of the report focuses on one camp where those issues were perhaps most acutely felt, namely Katale camp, from which a number of INGOs ultimately withdrew in the face of the security problems and ethical dilemmas posed therein.

The experience of the Rwanda emergency is proving to have been a watershed in international relief and development INGOs' perception of themselves and their roles in the international relief system. It was certainly the largest, most complex, and arguably most sophisticated INGO response ever. The immense suffering of the Rwandan people during 1994 - when fully 60% of the population lost their lives or were displaced from their homes - was also, ironically, a financial and public relations bonanza for these agencies whose *raison d'être* is precisely to prevent such suffering. Moreover, it involved INGOs in a series of ethical and political dilemmas which saw them feeding and even hiring men and women who had committed crimes against humanity, and implicated them in the resuscitation of the otherwise failing regime which had conducted the genocide. These dilemmas were not unprecedented but were certainly more acutely felt in Rwanda than in previous emergencies, and INGOs are still seeking answers to the questions they raised. The Rwanda experience was thus simultaneously international INGOs finest hour, a financial bonanza, and the cause of a crisis of role and identity: at one and the same time a proud and profound confirmation of INGOs' role, and a shattering of the paradigms which underpin that role and give it coherence. Among the paradigms which was thrown into doubt by Rwanda - as by other emergencies - was the ideal of neutral humanitarianism.

This report reaches a number of conclusions about INGOs' performance in Rwanda.

• First, performance on the conventional, technical aspects of emergency humanitarian response were for the most part, given the extraordinarily traumatic conditions, what they should have been: swift, and sufficient to the task.

• Second, in looking at the massive escalation of violence in Rwanda in the summer of 1994, it is evident that no INGO had clear early warning of it, nor were many INGOs involved in attempts to forestall a potential escalation of the violence of the civil war. There were some few exceptions to this: a handful of INGOs engaged in conflict resolution/prevention type activities during the civil war years. Of course, these ultimately failed, along with broader peacemaking efforts by the international community.

• Third, the way in which those forestalling efforts failed provides counter-evidence to the claim that INGOs, being close to the ground, close to local actors, have a structural advantage in early warning and forestalling roles.

• Fourth, ironically, part of what undermined INGOs potential early warning and forestalling capacity was precisely their technical efficiency: the nature of some INGO responses to the growing humanitarian crisis in Rwanda before the genocide undermined what might have been an important opportunity to process the increasing signals of escalating violence.

• Fifth, INGOs performed badly on questions of mapping and intelligence of the humanitarian aspects of the emergency, once it had broken, but no worse than other elements of the humanitarian response system, such as UN agencies, and in part performed badly *because* of the UN system.

• Sixth, on the question of drawing international public and political attention to the emergency, INGOs arguably performed better than other actors.

• Seventh, INGOs provided relief assistance to a large number of combatants of the Rwandan civil war and genocide who had no claim on such assistance, but did so in the absence of other options, coping as they were with the neglect of the state actors - principally Zaire and also the Security Council permanent members - responsible for creating secure conditions for humanitarian operations.

• Eight, INGOs' own efforts to tackle the ethical and political issue of providing aid to combatants were ineffective, and did little to support other international agencies' efforts to generate robust international action.

• Ninth, the humanitarian response to the refugees in Goma, in the absence of a security framework, had the unintended consequence of resucitating the genocide regime in exile, and thus lay the groundwork for renewed conflict in the sub-region.

More profoundly, this report argues that INGOs were called upon in Rwanda to respond in neutral, humanitarian terms to a situation with political features which made neutrality morally compromising. In the context of the refugee camps in Zaire, neutrality translated into aiding and abetting a regime guilty of genocide. There were, however, three elements of that context well beyond INGOs' control: the failure of international security mechanisms to respond to the genocide itself in April through July of 1994; the effective failure of the Zairian state to fulfill its legal obligation to provide security for the Rwandan refugees; and the abdication of the residual responsibility on the part of the Security Council to deal with security in Zaire. This left humanitarian actors alone to deal with the consequences. It is far from surprising that under these circumstances INGOs found themselves stuck on the horns of a political dilemma, faced with a choice between feeding the henchmen of genocid e or allowing legitimate refugees to suffer.

This was not the first time humanitarian agencies faced this dilemma, nor is it likely to be the last. Indeed, as this report was being drafted, in October 1996, INGOs were facing similar issues in eastern Zaire, in part as a result of the way in which the problem was *not* handled in 1994. The events surrounding the 'Banyamulenge' uprising - the fighting in the Kivu region of eastern Zaire, the further displacement of large numbers of refugees, the presumned massacres of a substantial number of those refugees, and the broader Zairian civil war, waged with Rwandan support - stemmed directly from the unfinished business of the Rwandan civil war and emergency.

For this reason, the question posed by Rwanda is an enduring one: will INGOs continue to adopt the stance of neutral humanitarianism when states and their security mechanisms have failed to create a context in which that stance is politically meaningful and morally valid? The answer to that question will be a central one in the politics of humanitarianism at the end of this century.

NOTE ON METHODS AND SOURCES

The enormity of the Rwandan experience - both in terms of the immensity of the disaster itself, and the scale of the response - necessitated choices about which aspects of it to cover in a limited research project. The choices were for the most part dictated by the intersection of the thematic concerns, the exigencies of data collection, and the coverage of other literature. Because the project as a whole seeks to examine complex political emergencies from the level of INGO experience (as opposed to donor/UN level), a decision was taken to keep the methodological focus for the report on interviews with NGO personnel involved in various stages of the crisis and response.

This proved difficult, as those people are now spread far and wide across the map of current humanitarian crises, and as the report evolved more use than anticipated was made of documentary sources. The fact of the geographical diffusion of the personnel involved also dictated an unintended overemphasis on the large and medium-sized international INGOs, as the law of numbers determined that relevant staff from these organisations could be found in the cities where the research was conducted - London, Washington, New York, Ottawa, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, and Kigali. Many of the small INGOs which sprung up in the Rwanda response are now, simply, nowhere to be found. More grievously, many of the personnel of the local NGOs, particularly those involved in human rights advocacy before the genocide, were early victims of that tragedy, while others have been implicated in it.

The resultant focus on the medium and large international INGOs is both positive and negative. The downside is rather less breadth than would

otherwise be the case; the upside is a wider applicability of the issues tackled herein - for it is these INGOs which will (and indeed currently do) respond to the next complex emergency either in east and central Africa or in other parts of the world.

Throughout the report, references are made where possible to other literature which covers issues in greater depth. In particular, close attention is paid to the findings of the OECD Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda.[3] Discussions with NGO personnel during the preliminary phases of researching this project revealed a common perception that the Evaluation more fully covered the Rwanda operations as experienced at the UN and donor levels than at the NGO level. This report, in many senses, can be read as a companion piece to that work, written as far as possible from an INGO perspective.

A further notation issue: INGOs such as CARE and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) which have many different country offices, with separate organisational identities, are identified by their full name when first identified in a section but only by their partial name for subsequent references. Thus, references to CARE Canada in a particular section will be followed by references simply to CARE, until it is necessary to re-identify the country office. If, for example, CARE Canada and CARE Kenya are both referred to in the same section, they will be identified in full.

Many of the sources used in this report are confidential. Where they are not, they are referenced either in the body of the text or in footnotes. A list of sources at the end of the document lists organisations who provided documents, even when those documents were confidential. Over 50 interviews were conducted for this study, and most of the persons involved are identified; some chose to remain unidentified. Finally, in some instances materials gathered through the author's involvement in the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance in Rwanda were used in the production of this report; in all such instances, any relevant restrictions on citation or quotation continue to be respected.

[3]Of which the author of this report was contributing author for Study II on conflict management and early warning, and research assistant for Study III, on humanitarian response.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PRELUDE TO A GENOCIDE: BRIEF HISTORY OF THE RWANDAN CIVIL CRISIS

1.1.1 THE CIVIL WAR

A brief history of the Rwandan emergency might begin with 1 October 1990, when an armed refugee movement, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda from southern Uganda. The invasion was itself the culmination of previous strife of a type frequently seen in Africa, and elsewhere: victims or losers in a conflict seek refuge in a neighboring country, which then becomes a base for invading their homeland. In this case, large numbers of Rwanda's Tutsi minority, who had been the losers in a violent struggle for political control in Rwanda during the decolonisation process, fled to surrounding countries. The largest concentration of Tutsi refugees was in southern Uganda. Repeated efforts by the refugees to return had been of no avail until a generation of Rwandans born in exile launched a new invasion in 1990. The objective was to permit full and free settlement in Rwanda - a demand consistently denied by Rwanda's President Habyarimana - and to force the regime to accept power sharing arrangements that would give Tutsis significant political representation in the government. The attack was propitiously timed to take advantage of support from Uganda's President Museveni[4] and a decline in the political and economic fortunes of the Habyarimana regime.[5]

(For some notes on the economic and political situation under Habyarimana, see Appendix 3.)

Invasion was quickly met with intervention. On October 5, France sent roughly 150 paratroopers from bases in nearby Central African Republic to bolster the Habyarimana regime. These troops did not engage the RPF, as some believe, but rather backstopped the Forces Armées Rwandaise (FAR)[6] in Kigali, securing the airport and other major sites. Zaire also sent troops to Rwanda, and these did engage the RPF, notably in Gabiro where their presence was insufficient to stop the first major RPF victory of the war. Zaire's troops were recalled shortly after that defeat.[7]

The fortunes of the RPF underwent a sharp but temporary decline after the capture of Gabiro. Their commander, Major-General Fred Rwigyema, had been killed on the first day of fighting in a fluke of war. Shortly after Gabiro was captured, two more senior

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[4]It should be noted that the situation of the Tutsi refugees in Uganda was becoming untenable. By supporting the RPF's invasion of Rwanda, the Museveni regime killed two birds with one stone: repaying a debt to his Tutsi allies and solving a difficult internal political issues.

[5]In the late 1980s, a series of economic shocks had crippled the Rwandan economy, which until that point had been relatively stable, albeit poor. Principal among those shocks was the 1989 collapse in world price of coffee, Rwanda's major export product, which caused a sharp decline in the country's balance of payments situation. This, along with other ills, forced Rwanda to begin negotiations with the IMF on a Structural Adjustment Program, adopted just after the outbreak of civil war, a fate Rwanda had avoided longer than most sub-Saharan African countries. 1989-90 saw a continued decline in the country's economy, coupled with a sharp rise in unemployment, both of which were then exacerbated by drought in a number of parts of the country. For details of the economic crisis, and its political impact, see in particular Newbury (1992) and JEval, I.

[6]The French acronym is used in this report because the English acronym, RGF - for Rwandese Government Forces - is to easily confused with RPF.

[7]Belgium also sent troops to Rwanda at this time, but only long enough to protect Belgian nationals. Zaire's troops were withdrawn in part because, unpaid and ill-disciplined as they were, they were wrecking havoc wherever they were deployed, looting, raping, pillaging - a foretaste of later events.

commanders were killed in a FAR ambush. Disoriented by the loss of leadership, the RPF retreated, splitting into two groups, one which melted into the forests and swamps of the Akagera National Park in the east, and one which stole along the Rwanda-Uganda border to the Virunga National Park in the northwest.

In Virunga, the RPF regrouped under Major Paul Kagame, a charismatic Tutsi in his thirties who had earned his leadership position through years of tough fighting: first with the Tanzanians against Idi Amin, then with Museveni against Milton Obote, and finally as Museveni's Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence. Recalled from a training program at Fort Levenworth, Kagame provided the RPF with the necessary leadership to sustain the rigours of life in the high altitudes and cold weather of the Virunga mountains. From this vantage point they launched a series of guerrilla attacks in northern Rwanda which succeeded, by mid-1991, in making the northern part of the country a region where the FAR could not travel except at high risk. In November 1991, the FAR launched a strong attack on the RPF's position in the Virungas. When that attack failed, the momentum swung back to the RPF's favour. During the first months of 1992, the RPF consolidated its position in the north, creating a de facto RPF-held zone extending along almost the whole Uganda-Rwanda border.

1.1.2 THE NEGOTIATIONS

While the fighters fought, the talkers talked. Notwithstanding the somewhat peripheral nature of Rwanda to major western powers, the October 1990 invasion quickly triggered a series of regional and international peacemaking efforts. Just two weeks after the invasion, Tanzania called a regional meeting of the Heads of State of Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire to discuss the situation, and, fearing further refugee flows, remained actively involved and became host as well as "facilitator" for the subsequent peace talks. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Secretariat was also active in recognition of the organization's principle that African states have a primary responsibility to address regional conflicts. Other actors were soon informed or engaged - the (informal) Economic Community of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL), the European Union and, more peripherally, the UN. Additionally the governments of Belgium, France and the United States at various times helped to move the process forward. The Belgian government became actively involved within days of the invasion, pushing forward a regional mediation process which achieved a cease-fire within four months.

All this activity was ineffective; the initial success of regional diplomacy was short-lived. A formal cease-fire signed at N'Sele, Zaire on 29 March 1991 lasted only to mid-April, when fighting resumed. The limits of regional diplomacy were revealed when a second cease-fire broke down in early 1992. It required a push from France - supported by more limited but parallel diplomatic suasion by the US Under Secretary of State, Herman Cohen - to get the conflicting parties back to the negotiation table. The European Union, Canada, Switzerland, the Vatican and others also counseled peace talks. The result was the Arusha peace process, launched in the summer of 1992, which concluded in a comprehensive settlement signed in August 1993.

1.1.3 THE ARUSHA PERIOD (JUNE 92 - AUGUST 93)

The Arusha process brought together the RPF, the ruling party, and Rwandese opposition parties which had grown up during the civil war. Supporting the negotiations were international organizations which had a stake or a role in Rwanda, including the OAU, western donor countries, and the UN. The Tanzanian government formally acted as a "facilitator", and undertook a sustained and skillful mediating effort that was critical in bringing about an agreement.

From the start of the Arusha process in June of 1992 until February 1993, an uneasy cease-fire curtailed RPF activities. The Arusha negotiations began to outline the course of a peaceful transition of power from the Habyarimana regime to a broad based regime.

However, by January 1993 the Arusha negotiations were stuck over the details of power-sharing arrangements. A government massacre of Tutsis in the north of the country at the end of January signaled the unwillingness of Kigali hard-liners to agree to proposed compromises. Frustrated by the lack of progress and enraged by the killings, the RPF launched an offensive in February 1993.

The RPF offensive was a major success. Thousands of the FAR's troops fled in the face of the advancing enemy, many of them deserting the army altogether. The offensive shocked Kigali and threw the government forces into disarray. With the FAR scattering in front of them, the RPF fought to within 23 miles of Kigali, stopping only in the face of French reinforcements and international pressure. RPF, French and Tanzanian military sources agree that had the RPF chosen at this moment to continue to fight, the French reinforcements would have been insufficient to prevent total FAR defeat.

In New York, the UN system responded to the disruption of the peace process. In March, the Secretary-General sent a team to Rwanda which helped bring the parties back to the negotiating table. The Security Council also approved a military observer mission to monitor the Uganda-Rwanda border, designed to stop Ugandan supplies flowing to the RPF.

As the negotiations neared completion, the role of the peacekeepers was extended. The Accords called for the deployment of a Neutral International Force to oversee the implementation of the agreement, the principal feature of which was the creation of a transitional broad based regime leading to democratic elections scheduled to be held 22 months after the signing. A new national army composed of units from both sides in the civil war was to be formed; the rest would be demobilized. Invoking Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council voted to deploy a UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to oversee the installation of the transitional government and other parts of the peace agreement, in particular, to assist in disarming and demobilizing the two armies.

1.1.4 BUILDING AND SUBVERTING THE PEACE

The signing of a peace agreement in August 1993 and the deployment of UNAMIR two months later - i.e. the initial success of what may be characterized as preventive diplomacy - did nothing to halt the rapid deterioration of the political situation in Kigali in the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994. As peacemakers and peacekeepers attempted to put the Arusha structures in place, their opponents - hard-line forces in Kigali who lost out in the Arusha process - worked to knock them down. As the pro-Arusha forces attempted to establish the institutions and mechanisms of power-sharing, the extremists laid the ground work and then set in motion a radical alternative to the Arusha power-sharing plan: a mass genocide against the Tutsi population and a return to war against the RPF.

Their efforts were bolstered by the assassination of President Ndadaye in Burundi in October 1993, and the mass killings which followed. In that month, a five month old experiment in democratic power-sharing in Burundi collapsed when the Tutsi-dominated army launched what turned out to be an abortive coup which nevertheless undermined the nascent democratic system. This in turn generated a week of mass killings, Hutus forces took their revenge on Tutsi civilians and the Burundian army retaliated with bloody force. Later estimates would place the dead at between 35,000 and 50,000 split equally between the two ethnic groups, but at the time in the region the killing spree was widely reported to be far larger - as high as 150,000 to 200,000. The reality was bad enough, and sent tens of thousands of Burundians fleeing from the country.

The killings in Burundi helped push Rwanda faster down the slope into collapse and genocide. Since February 1993, it had been moving steadily down that slope, but until October 1993 there was still a reasonable hope that the course could be reversed. After

the killings in Burundi, the course was firmly set. Among other things, the October 1993 killings in Burundi sharply increased these fears of the Rwandan population. To western ears, the Habyarimana regime's propaganda that the RPF were returning to Rwanda to re-impose slavery and other evils on the Hutu, rang shallow and cynical; yet across the border in Rwanda's sister country, a Tutsi military was executing Hutus in their masses (the stories of Hutus massacring Tutsis did not make into the extremist propaganda.) Moreover, the killings had come only months after Burundi had attempted a democratic experiment similar to that now being proposed for Rwanda.

(For more details on the role of ethnicity in the political discourse of Rwanda, see Appendix 3.)

What is more, the UN peacekeeping force being sent to Rwanda to protect the populations from such a breakdown (this was not UNAMIR's mandate, but it was very much how it was perceived in Rwanda), was late arriving: UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire and his advance mission had the misfortune to arrive in Rwanda on the same day as the assassination in Burundi. Not only was UNAMIR immediately required to divert some of its (not over large) force to the Burundi border region, but the stark contrast between the late, partial arrival of UNAMIR and the killings in Burundi meant that UNAMIR started life in Rwanda under a cloud of Rwandan skepticism (which turned out to be well-justified.)

1.1.5 DESCENT INTO GENOCIDE

The deployment of UNAMIR in Rwanda did little or nothing to slow Rwanda's disintegration. By February 1994, the program of assassination and disruption reached a fevered pitch with the killing of leading opposition member, and key moderate, Felicien Gatabazi. On February 23, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) special representative Michel Moussali warned that Rwanda faced "a bloodbath of unparalleled proportions" unless action was taken to restore stability. In the end, it was precisely when action was taken to restore stability - when Tanzania and the OAU convened an emergency session of the Arusha principals on April 5 - that the bloodbath was unleashed. The plane carrying Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira from that meeting was shot down on April 6, and genocide begun in Rwanda. The *Times* report of the event is quoted here in its entirety:

> The leaders of Rwanda and Burundi were killed last night when their plane was shot down by a rocket, according to UN officials, as it approached the airport at the Rwandan capital of Kigali.

The Rwandan emergency had arrived.

The genocide was planned and to a large extent controlled by a tightly organized group of extremists from within the Habyarimana power structure: members of the ruling *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND) party, leaders of the Presidential Guard, the *interahamwe* and *impuzamugambi* militias, and members of the hard-line political grouping, the *Coalition pour le défense de la République* (CDR). In the first days of the killings, this group massacred the Tutsi population of Kigali and wiped out the ranks of moderate politicians and civil society leaders, most of them Hutu. Over the next three months, unchecked by any international force, the extremists systematically slaughtered Tutsi populations across the country, killing hundreds of thousands of people before the RPF's victory on 17 July 1994 drove them into final retreat.

The central motive for the genocide was to retain political power and the economic rewards that went with it. Given the history and ethnic structure of Rwanda, the political contest over who would control the state machinery had developed along a deepening majority-minority divide. Members of the Hutu majority community which planned,

organized, and directed the genocide stood to lose power as a result of the power-sharing arrangements negotiated in Arusha. Additionally, some feared that the RPF would use its legitimized entry into national politics and foothold in the new national army to engineer a coup. In either case, the Tutsi were perceived as the winners. The fear which this prospect generated among the Hutu population - and which took extreme forms among some of the power-holders and their followers - must be understood against the historical memory of Tutsi overlordship before and during the colonial period, and the practice of treating power transfer as a totalistic, zero-sum game and a 'winner-takes-all' attitude. As the direction of civil war became clear, and power-sharing was on the horizon, Hutu extremist ideologues deliberately exploited this history to whip up ethnic fears, and used this fear to create space for their program of mass killing. They were aided in this by the repeated displacement many Hutus experienced as a result of the civil war, and by events in Burundi, which lent credence to their radical portrayal of the 'Tutsi devils' of the RPF.

It is critical to be clear that the genocide was not spontaneous, not an eruption of ancient tribal hatreds, as it was quickly portrayed by the western media. Rather, this was a planned, coordinated, directed, controlled attack by a small core, with the support of the senior elements of the state machinery, and arguably as many as 100,000 but possibly as few as 25,000 'henchmen' - a large number of people, especially at the larger estimate, but virtually all under the direct control of central authorities.

All sources estimate deaths in the Rwandan genocide between 500,000 and 1 million, with the bulk of estimates falling at the larger end of the spectrum. Analysis of pre-genocide census data, counts of refugee populations, and estimates of deaths, lead to an informed estimate of 800-900,000 deaths, the figure chosen by Studies II and III of the Joint Evaluation, as well as by Gérard Prunier, in his *The Rwanda Crisis* (1995). The rate of killing in Rwanda, roughly 75,000 victims per week sustained over a twelve week period, exceeds that of Cambodia, and equals the industrialised Nazi death machine at its most active point.

It is this massive program of slaughter - arguably the most intense program of killing in all of human history - that set the stage for the "Rwanda emergency". As the genocide regime fled from defeat at the hands of the RPF, it drove in front of it the largest wave of refugees ever witnessed. As the RPF broke through government lines in Byumba and swept through the east of the country, a quarter of a million refugees fled in front of them, crossing into Tanzania at the beginning of May. The RPF then fought a protracted battle for Kigali, which they won on June --. As they chased the retreating FAR across the west of the country, a further 2 million Rwandans fled their homes. Over a million fled into Zaire when the last government stronghold in Gisenyi, fell on July 14th. Just under a million more sought refugee inside Rwanda when a French intervention force - Operation Turquoise - created a 'safe-haven' in southwest Rwanda. The refugees outflows from the renewed civil war, as well as the mass of displaced persons inside Rwanda, were the focal points of INGO response to humanitarian crisis which flowed out of the genocide.

1.1.6 STATE FAILURE, STATE COLLAPSE

The 1994 crisis in Rwanda is often referred to as one a series of cases of "state failure" - the others, depending on whose list is used, including Somalia, Zaire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, sometimes former Yugoslavia. The literature on complex political emergencies connects the phenomenon to this concept of state failure, or state collapse as it is alternatively called. This is so far an ill-defined concept, and its application to Rwanda has been made only loosely. Nevertheless, some notes on it are worth making.

The humanitarian emergency in Rwanda was not a product of a case of state failure *comme les autres*. Whereas in Somalia, for example, state failure had literally been that (the failure of the state to use its legitimacy or impose its authority on groups within

the national territory) the dynamics of state collapse in Rwanda were radically different. In Rwanda, the state itself - still functioning in a technical sense - turned on a portion of its own population, with genocidal purposes. The horrific efficiency of the genocide, as it was being conducted *by the state itself*, illustrates that in a technical sense the state machinery was still active in Rwanda during the period of genocide. State failure has a different sense in this phase of Rwandan events: a radical failure of the state to fulfill its legal and moral responsibilities to its citizenry - indeed, a radical perversion of this responsibility, a twisting of the concept of state protection to mean the destruction of a 'threatening' element of society.

Genocide in Rwanda produced a massive humanitarian 'emergency' in the real terms of the commission of tremendous human rights violations, but not 'the Rwandan emergency' to which the international community responded on an unprecedented scale. That second emergency was created, indirectly, by the July victory of the RPF over the Rwandan regime, and, directly, by the successful efforts of the fleeing members of the former Rwandan regime to drive over a million Rwandans from their homes in an effort to create a base for themselves in other territories, as it became clear that the genocide had 'failed' - in that it was not complete and in that it had not turned the tide in the civil war. The refugee and displaced persons crisis itself, then, was not caused by state collapse but *was the cause of it*. For at this stage, the Rwandan state did collapse, albeit even then only in a particular sense.

As the former regime fled RPF victory, they looted and wrecked the physical and financial apparatus of the Rwandan state, as well as driving the population of western Rwanda from their homes. The RPF government established in July found itself without resources with which to attempt reconstruction or reconciliation, and without a population in over half of Rwanda. In this sense, they governed a state which had collapsed. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made here between a situation such as in Somalia where the executive core of the state fails to function, and the case in post-genocide Rwanda, where the new executive core functioned, even enjoying international legitimacy and support, but lacked critical resources to extend its legitimacy or authority beyond the core.

Thus the Rwandan state both failed (in the sense of responsibility) and then collapsed (in the sense of capacity), but not simultaneously, and with a different causal relationship to the humanitarian aspects of the crisis than is sometimes assumed. The key points here are:

* the genocide (the most extreme phase of the humanitarian emergency) was a function of a state turning on a part of its population, not of state collapse;
* the state collapse which did occur (post genocide), did not cause the refugee movements but rather was caused by them, and by the deliberate looting of the fleeing regime;
* the Rwandan state post-July collapsed in a functional but not a political sense.

The distinctions made here between typologies of state collapse are significant in terms of their implications for international response. The international community's efforts in Rwanda after July 1994, for instance, operated under different circumstances from those which prevailed in Somalia, in that they were supported by and (at least in principle, but insufficiently in practice) supportive of a legitimate government.

Furthermore, the major element of INGOs response to the Rwandan emergency took place in Zaire, itself a country which scholars referred to in terms of failed states. The situation in Zaire is one in which the central authorities in Zaire - specifically President Mobutu and his Presidential Guard - do not attempt, and are probably not able, to ensure order and stability throughout the country. In the eastern province of Kivu, where the Rwandan refugee emergency occurred, central Zairian authority is remote. This certainly exacerbated the difficulties faced by INGOs and UN agencies in attempting to

provide relief to refugees in this region. This is further complicated, however, by the fact that the central authorities in Zaire, such as they are, were allied to the Habyarimana regime, and continued to support that regime when it fled into exile. Some of the difficult security and political issues which arose in Zaire did so because Zaire as a state has partially collapsed or failed, ie. was weak systems of authority, but they also arose because Zaire chose to fail, chose not to fulfill its international legal responsibilities to the refugee population.

Thus, INGOs responding to the Rwandan emergency did so in the extraordinary circumstances of the Rwandan state under Habyarimana radically failing to protect its citizenry; the Rwandan state under the RPF experiencing collapse in technical terms; and the Zairian state under Mobutu having partially collapsed systems of security and authority and moreover failing - in the ordinary sense - to use what state capacity it did have to create conditions of security and order within which INGOs could operate. These conditions, as demonstrated below, left INGOs facing political and security challenges far beyond their competence but also well outside the bounds of their responsibility.

1.2 - PRELUDE TO AN EMERGENCY: BRIEF HISTORY OF INGO INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA.

1.2.1 - INGOS BEFORE THE GENOCIDE

It is in the nature of the charity business that the less important a country in the realpolitik of arms and economics, the more important it is likely to be in the pantheon of humanitarians. Certainly Rwanda, politically marginal though it was, had long been the site of significant INGO involvement. A number of international INGOs had a long-standing presence in Rwanda: OXFAM and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) since the late 1960s, CARE and others since the early 1980s. INGO work in the country was broad but fairly conventional. Seed distribution, provision of agricultural tools and implements, irrigation: these were the staples of INGO efforts to alleviate poverty in what was then (and is still) one of the world's poorest countries. OXFAM, CARE, and MSF were the three largest international INGOs. (Other major humanitarian agencies included Belgian Red Cross, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN humanitarian agencies.)

The onset of the civil war in 1990 was not, for most INGOs, a source of major disruption. Some INGOs concentrated their work in the southwest of the country where average land holdings were smallest (ca. 0.25 hectares, compared to ca. 2.0 hectares in the northeast, the breadbasket of the country.) The southwest was largely unaffected by the civil war, which was confined until 1993 to a zone along the northern border with Uganda and a zone along the northeastern border with Tanzania. Other INGOs, including CARE, which had programs in Byumba province in the northeast, experienced some disruption when the initial invasion occurred in that region. However, FAR reverses of RPF advances soon saw the fighting disperse towards Virunga National Forest in the northwest and the Akagera National Park in the east, neither of which were areas with particularly intensive INGO activity. For the most part, from the first invasion in October 1990 until the February 1993 offensive mentioned in the previous section, INGOs continued to work in Rwanda in traditional development modes of operation.

1.2.1.a - Efforts to Forestall an Escalation of the Crisis

In the years since the Rwanda crisis, many have asked whether development and relief INGOs could not play a more substantial role in *preventing* humanitarian emergencies, rather than simply responding to them. For the most part, international INGOs in Rwanda from 1990 to early 1993 did not take on any role in dampening the existing

conflict or preventing any potential escalation. There are two important and one minor exceptions.

First, Catholic Relief Services apparently used its position in Kigali, a quite influential position which came through its strong connection to the Catholic church, to support broader church efforts to deal with the question of ethnicity and to promote acceptance of the idea of sharing power within the Habyarimana regime. Few details of this process have been made public, and CRS' efforts were for the most part bound up in efforts by such figures as the Papal Nuncio to have the church play a constructive role in the Rwandan peace negotiations. That these broader efforts were ultimately a disastrous failure does not necessarily mean that CRS's efforts were wasted or misguided. What little evidence of these efforts exists suggests that CRS's work was a small part of a broader process and did little of either positive or negative impact. In any case, CRS is something of a case apart for INGOs, given its strong ties to the Catholic church, which gives it clout, but may deny it impartiality.

The lessons of the second exception are more widely applicable to international development and relief INGOs. In 1992, OXFAM launched a program to tackle the violence and conflict in Rwandan society. OXFAM was, according to diplomatic sources, one of the few agencies in Rwanda with "power in Kigali." (The others were Caritas/CRS, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).) It's influence came not through its high level connections among official circles in Kigali - indeed, OXFAM staff may be surprised to learn that they were considered to have power in Kigali - but through its important role as a the major funding agency for 'civil society' groups. OXFAM used its position to attempt to diminish the recourse to violence in Rwanda society. Most visible among their efforts was a program called Education for Non-Violence and Democracy (ENVD), run under the broader umbrella of a Catholic Church program called 'Justice et Paix'.[8] The experience illustrates many of the challenges that face INGO efforts to engage in this sort of political programming.

The ENVD program was advertised through local parishes and brought people together and sought to raise their awareness of issues such as ethnic relations (which were rarely discussed in Rwandan society), democratic process, and human rights. Its strength was that the issues addressed were those raised by participants. The program had some success, at least in that OXFAM received calls from participants for more opportunities to engage in this type of dialogue. However, the program was limited in scope - never, for example, attempted in Kigali, the absolute power centre of Rwandan society. In 1993, as the crisis in Rwanda began to deepen, the ENVD was in hiatus, in a period of adjustment as the lessons of the early round were absorbed.

In hindsight it is clear that the program suffered from major weaknesses; these weaknesses are clearly recognised by OXFAM staff who dealt with the program, either in Kigali or Oxford. Most important is the question of having run the program through the Catholic Church. Anne Macintosh, the country director responsible for the program, later argued that OXFAM might have done well to have involved the Protestant churches. OXFAM did attempt to involve Rwandan human rights organisations, but without succees.[9] The Catholic Church itself was grappling with the thorny issue of ethnicity in its own ranks.[10] Indeed, as has now become clear, many of

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[8] Other activities included channeling information to Amnesty International and other human rights agencies.

[9] As many observers of the Rwandan human rights scene have noted, Rwandan human rights NGOs had by 1991-92 fallen into infighting, and many were increasingly associated with particular political parties.

[10] The Papal Nuncio in Kigali at the time had been sent out specifically to help the local church come to grips with the divisive ethnic relations within its own ranks. He had begun to register what appeared to be some small successes when the genocide was launched - with the connivance and

the church's leading figures, up to and including the Catholic Bishop of Kigali, Msr. Vincent Nsengyumva, were deeply implicated in the planning and later the commission of the genocide. Moreover, several of the people who OXFAM had worked with and put through the ENVD, themselves turned out to be accomplices in the execution of the genocide. It is important to note, however, that other members of the Church were actively, and passionately involved in the search for non-violent solutions to Rwanda's political crisis, including Jean-Pierre Goding, one the ENVD's principal animators.

Finally, one other international INGO attempted to play a role in the peace process. London staff of Christian Aid who had ties to Uganda's President Museveni, held secret meetings in Bujumbura with the RPF and the government of Rwanda. However, in three years of research into conflict management efforts in Rwanda, I encountered no one - including among the RPF - who believed that the Christian Aid initiative had any relevance. Kigali-based diplomats of the period dismissed Christian Aid's initiative as "trivial."

(Local and international human rights INGOs engaged in other activities which are relevant, though not strictly within the remit of this report - see Appendix 2).

1.2.1.b - Shifting to Emergency Programming

By early 1993, INGO's development work in Rwanda was thrown on its head by the consequences of the February 1993 RPF offensive. In retrospect, this is a critical turning point both in INGO's experience and in the crisis itself, and is explored at some length below, as the first of three detailed episodes through which thematic issues are explored. Suffice it for now to note that the offensive produced large numbers of displaced persons, and forced INGOs onto an emergency footing.

This process was furthered in October 1993 when political violence in Burundi produced large numbers of refugees (JEval, III, 29). At least 375,000 refugees crossed into southern Rwanda, and another 250,000 fled to Tanzania. (On top of these figures, a further 300,000 were displaced inside Burundi, a some tens of thousands also crossed into Zaire.) Because the INGOs in Rwanda were already on an emergency footing as a result of events there, they were quickly able to divert some of their capacity to dealing with Burundi refugees in the southern province of Butare, where they were concentrated. By the time this process was fully in place, Rwanda was, from a humanitarian perspective, completely on an emergency footing, and so it remained until April 1994, when the genocide was launched.

In the first chaotic days after the assassination of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira, INGOs scrambled not to respond but to escape. This was not a panicked reaction or an irresponsible one, but a response to attacks on local NGO staff and real threats to security of all INGO personnel. INGO country directors (CDs)[11] claim, with justification, that there was no time in the first week to attempt to focus on what was happening around them; getting their staff to safety was an absolute and consuming priority. Efforts to secure local staff were far from successful; every major international INGO lost local staff to the genocide. Local INGOs often fared worse, with many human rights organisations being wiped out in the first days. Having supported efforts to loosen the regimes grip on power was the equivalent of a death warrant.

What staff could, fled. Many international personnel were evacuated out of Kigali by air, while others crossed by land to neighbouring countries. Agency staff were dispersed throughout the countries of the region, and it was some time before they were able to regroup and consider their responses. Many local staff were unable to escape at this

participation of most of the Churches leading figures, including Msr. Nsengyumva.

[11] The acronym is used as shorthand for the variety of names NGOs give their senior in-country staff member.

stage: many parts of the city were under fire; some international INGO staff being evacuated by Belgian, French, and UN military convoys were told not to bring local staff along, for fear that having Rwandans in evacuation convoys would endanger all in the convoy. Many international INGO staff now recall leaving their Rwandan colleagues behind as one of the most traumatic elements of the entire gruesome episode.[12] Some international INGO staff were able to use their authority - and a healthy dose of bravery - to save the lives of local staff threatened by militias, giving these a chance to escape Rwanda. Many more were killed than saved.

1.2.1.c Early Warning of the Genocide

The genocide took the international INGO community entirely by surprise. Many had been tracking the political situation, and knew that the Arusha peace was unstable. In early 1994, Martha Campbell of CARE wrote:

> A cette époque beaucoup de gens esperaient que la paix finale serait proche et que les camps auraient disparus endeans les duex ou trois mois, aussitot que la zone FPR serait a neoveau ouverte. Helas, depuis lors la situation n'a pas du tout evolue. Les accords d'Arusha n'ont pas ete mis en application. Le gouvernement elargi au FPR n'est toujours pas en place. Beaucoup de questions restent en suspens et personne ne peut predire ce que reservera demain. L'avenir du pays reste plus qu'incertain.

But no INGO, CARE included, saw what was coming in either its scale, its swiftness, or its brutality.

This was not because there were no signals of what was brewing. In hindsight, there were relatively clear signals about what was coming in Rwandan society: rampantly extremist propaganda in various media sources, notoriously *Radio et Television Libre Milles Colines* (RTLM), distribution of parish lists to central military committees, orders sent to local administrators for to provide standby transport and logistical facilities for "national security purpose", the open training and of militias, the arming of civilian groups. In hindsight, these and other activities signaled the oncoming escalation. At the time, however, nobody in the international community, INGOs included, formed a clear picture of the form and scale of the coming escalation of violence.

Having failed, along with the rest of the international community, to prevent or foresee the escalation of the crisis, INGOs were left scrambling to respond to the escalation of its humanitarian consequences. For the three months between April and July, when the genocide was halted by the victory of the RPF over the Habyarimana regime, INGOs and their UN counterparts played a game of 'follow the refugees'. This entailed the following movements.

1.2.2 INGOS AFTER APRIL 1994

1.2.2.a (April-May) Tutsi refugees fleeing the genocide entered Mbarara region of southern Uganda, where the situation was quickly stabilised by the UN and INGOs operating in cooperation with both the Ugandan authorities and the RPF.

1.2.2.b (April-May-June) A large number of Tutsis were displaced by fighting in the RPF-held zone. The same UN agencies and INGOs dealing with new Rwandan refugees in Uganda launched cross-border operations from Kabale, on the Uganda-Rwanda border. INGOs operating in this zone were kept under tight control by the RPF, who insisted, for the most part, that INGO staff be accompanied at all times by RPF officers, and

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[12] In the aftermath of Rwanda, some agencies - notably ActionAid - have made commitments to their local staffthat the agency will stick with them even if they have to withdraw from a country of operation. How this might be implemented in emergency circumtances is unclear.

limited all but a handful of INGOs to daytime operations. The consensus among INGOs who ran operations in this region is that those operations quickly became quite routine, in the sense that the RPF provided strong security and tight control, although unimpeded access to camp populations was a problem. Operating conditions in this region did not, as might have been expected, have any of the characteristics of operating in a 'failed state'. Indeed, the following extract from a letter by a UN coordination official to a donor, suggests the opposite: the official described an INGO meeting in Kabale where "22 INGOs and UN agencies [were] almost falling over each other to work in the RPF zone. The RPF are having a great time playing agencies and INGOs against each other. A spectacle worth observing."[13]

1.2.2.c - (April-May-June) Among the most vulnerable populations were civilians in Kigali. Several INGOs attempted to reach Kigali from the RPF held zone but were blocked from doing so both by the RPF in some instances and by the UN itself, which refused to condone INGO access to Kigali during the genocide (see Appendix 4 on operations in Kigali.)

1.2.2.d - (May onwards) The first highly publicised involvement of INGOs in Rwanda came at the beginning of May when more then 200,000 (initially reported as 300,000) mostly Hutu refugees fleeing RPF advances in the north east found refuge in western Tanzania. The mass, rapid influx of refugees into the Karegwe region of Tanzania, particularly Ngara town, sparked a huge emergency relief operation by international INGOs - the first time since the onset of the genocide that the INGO community was able to reach Rwandans in any numbers outside of a war-zone.

1.2.2.e - (May-June) As the genocide was implemented, a small number of Tutsis fled to northern Burundi and eastern Zaire. A small number of INGO operations were started, especially in Goma, to meet the needs of these refugees. These small operations later overwhelmed by a far larger outflux to the same area.

1.2.2.f - (May-June) As noted above, as the RPF advanced into western Rwanda, roughly two million persons fled towards the Zaire border. As many as a million of these halted their flight in southwestern Rwanda when France sent Operation Turquoise into the zone, and established a safe haven. INGOs and UN agencies were able to access the displaced populations in this region from bases in northern Burundi.

1.2.2.g - (July onwards) When the last government stronghold fell on July 14th, 1.2 million refugees fled across into Zaire. This episode is explored at greater length in Section 2.2 below.

1.2.2.h - (June-July onwards) Victories by the RPF in the east and centre of the country increased the access to Rwanda by INGOs operating out of Kabale, Uganda. When the RPF finally defeated the FAR in Kigali, and shortly thereafter in the west of the country, INGOs were able to start operations in Kigali itself, and shortly thereafter to start meeting the needs of the internally displaced from Kigali rather than Burundi.

1.2.2.i - (August onwards) On August 22nd, the French army pulled out of the safe haven, and out of Rwanda altogether. In advance of this, fearing RPF retribution, several hundred thousand displaced persons from the zone fled across into Zaire, at Bukavu. However, another several hundred thousand stayed in internally displaced camps inside Rwanda.

1.2.3 DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE CRISIS

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[13]The number of agencies continued to grow. A July 2nd meeting was represented by the following 27 agencies: World Relief, CARE, AMDA, PSF, Solidarité, MdM, ACORD, GED, MtD, CRS/Rwanda, UNICEF, MSF/B, CRS/Caritas, OXFAM, SCF, AMREF, CDC, WHO, MSF/H, USAID, ItalCoop, Samaritan's Purse, ICRC, World Vision, UNOMUR, UNAMIR, and UNREO.

While scrambling to respond across the Great Lakes Region, INGOs also worked hard to draw international attention to the Rwandan crisis. This was done principally through three tools. First, INGOs used their position within their home countries to attempt to move political opinion, largely through discrete lobbying in the form of letters and phone calls to relevant MPs, ministers of government, and other decision makers. This strategy of private lobbying, from what little concrete evidence is available, appears to have helped shape particular decisions concerning emergency aid once other strategies had raised public awareness of the crisis among the constituencies of the decision makers. The most notable lobbying effort was that of OXFAM, which used its policy department quickly to produce a manuscript on the situation, was the first humanitarian agency to refer to the situation in Rwanda as a genocide, and lobbied hard - though ultimately ineffectively - in New York, Washington, and London to generate a more substantive political response to the crisis.[14] On May 3rd, OXFAM worked with other groups to host a vigil in London, which walked to the steps of Parliament to raise awareness of the genocide.

Most effective in terms of raising public awareness of the crisis was the second strategy, a highly effective campaign to work with journalists covering the Rwandan crisis, and to use their media to put forward not only an interpretation of events and call for action, but also to highlight INGOs role in the response. This had two elements. First, INGOs in Zaire and Rwanda quickly added public relations staff to their teams, and went out of their way to provide journalists with access to camps and to the affected populations. INGO workers were frequently seen on evening news programs in Europe and North America commenting on the evolving crisis. By providing journalists with access to the situation, INGOs in return received extensive coverage which made a significant difference to the amount of public money raised for the response. More significantly, INGO public relations personnel are convinced - reasonably - that by increasing public awareness of the crisis they oiled the wheels of government emergency aid donations, and generally increased the flow of resources coming into the response.

While certainly valid, this argument also points to a problem with this system, namely the conflation of two tasks into one media strategy: raising awareness and fund raising. The need to raise funds drove a need to have profile, and thus INGOs not only provided journalists with access to the emergency, they ensured that the journalists cameras captured pictures of their logos displayed on tents, cars, t-shirts. There were certainly abuses of this system: one doctor who served with the UK charity Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN) told stories of another medical INGO allowing a camera crew to take patients out of operating theatres and into mock theatres constructed in the open air, "where the light was better." From the anecdotes told by journalists who covered the story, it would appear that such abuses took place not irregularly, but were certainly not the standard practice of the major INGOs in the field. More worrying was the systemic feature of this system, namely competition among aid agencies for journalistic coverage. Analysis of the coverage from Rwanda and Zaire at the height of the crisis suggests that analysis of the crisis itself took a backseat to profile raising.

Finally, some INGOs undertook fundraising campaigns which were designed not only to raise profile and funds but also to convey a political message. Most notable in this regard was MSF's "Doctors can't stop genocide" campaign, which drew on their experience of providing emergency medical relief in the middle of the genocide (see Appendix --) to incite more active engagement in the political and security aspects of the crisis. This campaign appears to have been successful in raising public awareness of the crisis, but

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[14]OXFAM's efforts during the acute phase of the crisis built on a longer term effort to raise awareness in the international community of the deteriorating situation in Rwanda. To this end, OXFAM had among other things worked with journalists to attempt to increase coverage of and attention to Rwanda.

was not complemented by a sophisticated lobbying effort targeted directly at decision makers.

Ultimately, INGOs can take credit for having been the principal source of public information about the crisis, and for having kept the issue alive for decision makers in the aid and emergency relief donor communities. Less successful were efforts to generate an effective political response to the underlying politics and security elements of the crisis itself. This distinction would play itself out again as the crisis evolved, when INGOs sound themselves facing a political and ethical dilemma which required action from action from international security mechanisms, an issue explored below in the third episode of the emergency to be considered in detail.

Turning to those episodes, a core focus of the report is on a distinction the one made in the paragraph above, namely the technical sophistication of INGOs which contrasts with less impressive political capacity. The tension between their high level of operational capacity and their much lower political capacity is explored in the section which follows. The section explores three 'episodes' of the crisis in an attempt to highlight the thematic concerns of the report: early warning and forestalling, mapping and intelligence, and operational response. The first episode, INGOs' response to a crisis of internally displaced persons in 1993, is explored to provide a window on the tension between early warning/forestalling questions and the technical operations of INGOs; the second, INGO responses to the Goma influx in July 1994 details the operational capacity of INGOs but contrasts it to weaker performance on mapping and intelligence; and the third, which reviews security, political, and ethical concerns in one camp near Goma in the fall of 1994, attempts to provide an overall assessment of the political impact of INGO operations in the Rwanda crisis.

PART 2: EPISODES OF THE RWANDAN EMERGENCY

2.1 - ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS: RESPONDING TO THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED, FEBRUARY 1993

If there was ever a period during which INGOs might have been able to hear and process the signals of the momentum to the genocide, it was in the summer and fall of 1993. Growing extremism in Rwanda was most concretely evident in an increase in the number of 'small' massacres of Tutsis in various parts of the country - two or three hundred killed every time a concrete step towards power-sharing was taken. It was precisely such a massacre that prompted the February 1993 RPF offensive. The humanitarian consequences of that offensive produced a quantitative increase in INGO involvement in Rwanda, and a corresponding qualitative shift in the nature of that involvement, one which diminished their sensitivity and intelligence capacity precisely when these were needed most.

On February 8th, 1993, the RPF broke out from their front lines a few kilometres south of their headquarters at Mulindi. Mulindi is at the northern end of the highway which leads from Kigali, through the major northern city of Byumba, to the Ugandan border at Gatuna. The RPF advanced southward along this route, as well as striking southwest towards Ruhengiri, which they quickly captured. Within days the RPF had tripled the area under their control. As noted above, the FAR's resistance was decidedly weak, and by February 22nd, the RPF had moved to within 23 kilometres of the capital, Kigali. France rushed two waves of reinforcements to the country.

The RPF offensive produced a wave of roughly 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). Almost 500,000 people had previously been displaced from northern Rwanda by fighting during the civil war. They had been temporarily housed in camps in Byumba Prefecture and elsewhere, and although some had returned to their homes with the signing of the July 1992 cease-fire, many remained in these camps. The total IDP

population in Rwanda now swelled to almost 900,000. As Anne Macintosh, OXFAM U.K.'s country representative, later noted, this was the first of a series of disaster records that Rwanda was to set: the flood of IDPs in February 1993 was the largest, fastest displacement the humanitarian agencies had ever seen.[15]

Now the efforts of international INGOs to support sustained development in Rwanda - as well as those efforts, such as they were, to build up the capacity of Rwandan society to resist an escalation of violence - were put on hold. The needs of the displaced persons were tremendous, as described by Steve Wallace, CARE Rwanda's country representative at the time of the crisis:

> The problems, faced by the displaced persons, included food, water, sanitation, shelter, and fuel. For shelter, the displaced persons improvised small huts, using wooden poles and thatched with banana leaves or other vegetation. For fuel, they use whatever they can find, mainly unseasoned wood and crop residues and weeds. Cooking is on the traditional, but energy inefficient, three-stone stove. The water and sanitation situations were desperate and contributed to the poor health of the displaced population.

All the international agencies scrambled to respond to these needs.

The international community's response to the IDP crisis was somewhat slow to get off the ground, but once moving was coordinated and effective. MSF was characteristically first on the scene, providing emergency health and sanitation services to several camps just north of Kigali. MSF asked OXFAM to get involved in providing water in three which held 95,000 people in total, not 15 kilometres from Kigali. OXFAM fulfilled its specialty niche: John Howard, a water engineer, flew out to Kigali to provide portable water systems and get them running; once operational, they were handed over to MSF and CARE. During the process of setting up water systems in these three main camps, the INGOs had the existence of other camps near Murambi brought to their attention, and investigated. In the end, INGOs collaborated on servicing a total of eleven camps.

The breakdown of responsibility was essentially as follows. CRS, Caritas, and the ICRC were the main implementing partners of the World Food Program (WFP) in food distribution; OXFAM and CARE led on water and sanitation, supported by UN Childrens' Fund (UNICEF) and Caritas; MSF (H) and MSF (B) cooperated on the provision of health services, with the assistance of the Belgian Red Cross (BRC), Medecins de Monde (MdM), and Action Internationale Contre le Faim (AICF); social services were the responsibility of OXFAM-Quebec, Caritas, and Terre des Hommes. These efforts were, by all accounts, ably coordinated by two bodies, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). Bimonthly coordination meetings allowed for a reasonably smooth division of responsibilities and a fair degree of collaboration.

From an operational perspective, there is little to comment on about this first stage in the shift from development to emergency relief modes of operation. Response time was perhaps not what it might have been, but it was sufficient to the task. The needs of the IDPs were ably met, especially when the numbers eased somewhat at the end of March, with the signing of the Kinihara Cease-fire and the creation of a demilitarized zone (DMZ), which covered the RPF's territorial advances. The cease-fire and establishment of a DMZ allowed many IDPs to return home. This did not entirely end their reliance on humanitarian assistance, however, and CARE and other INGOs began work on providing the returnees with seeds, agricultural implements, and other necessary

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[15]There had in fact been larger displacements in history, notably "Operation Exodus" which in 1954 removed 900,000 Vietnamese from North to South Vietnam, as the two countries were about to become known. However, that displacement was an organised, controlled movement over several months; the Rwandan IDPs moved over the course of a few days.

materials to regenerate economic activity in the area. In general terms, the INGO response to the IDPs was considered by all concerned to have been highly successful - in technical terms, an excellent dry run of what was to follow.

2.1.1 FORESTALLING AND WARNING

Technically excellent, but politically problematic, for the ironic consequence of the response was to dimish the INGO community's focus on the signals which now began to grow about the plan for a genocide. The 'quantity' of INGOs engagement with Rwandan society grew during this period, but - from a political perspective - the 'quality' declined.

The impact of the IDP crisis was to shift traditional development activities to the back burner. More innovative programs tackling political issues - such as OXFAM's ENVD - were largely displaced by relief activities. Development programs did not stop, but no longer did these have the full attention of the INGOs staff, whose energies, especially at the country director level, were increasingly geared to the management of the emergency operations. Although most agencies ran separate emergency teams, these nevertheless in most cases reported to the country representatives, who were thus responsible for coordinating their activities, etc.

This diversion of energy and focus to emergency operations had a paradoxical impact. Most agencies began to loose track of the political situation in Rwanda at this critical time, paradoxically because emergency operations brought three things which should have enhanced INGOs' capacity to track and analyse political events - money, access to information, and a wider scope of movement within Rwanda - though that movement was sometimes curtailed when the regime imposed travel restrictions in areas where political violence was manifest. Instead, the emergency shifted INGOs into a mode of operations which, while it did not prevent them from 'hearing' what was going on in the populations with whom they were working with, focused their energies on other elements of their work, particularly the delivery of large volumes of relief supplies.

Before the IDP crisis, most international INGOs in Rwanda had fairly limited movement in Rwanda. This was not a function of insecurity, although in the north of the country this was something of an issue. For the most part, INGOs restricted their own movements in the sense that few traveled outside the areas where they had specific programs. Their familiarity with conditions in the country was dominated by the settings of their development projects. There were exceptions to this, of course, Caritas being the notable one, with projects across the country.

The sudden onset of emergency conditions in February 1993 began to change this. Suddenly, INGOs who had projects in just one region of the country were now responding in a much wider territory, and traversed the entire country in fulfillment of operational demands. Their access to RPF held territory was also at this time considerably enhanced, with reseeding and other programs getting underway in the zone. Moreover, INGOs suddenly found themselves with large budgets and good access to UN and diplomatic sources of information. Whereas in 1992, money for basic equipment was scarce, by March 1993 funding for even such expensive items as cars and trucks was no longer a problem. Even more important, from a mapping and intelligence perspective, INGO country directors (CDs) began to find themselves included in the first circles of information sharing. One CD who had previously had access, only occasionally, to second-secretary level diplomats and low level UN staff, now had access to the UN heads of agencies and the first-secretaries of the various chanceries, both key political analysts and information conduits.

Yet the combination of money, information, and physical access to the country did not result in an enhancement of INGOs' political analysis or monitoring of the situation, for two reasons. One was a simple lack of time. The management of emergency programs sapped time and focus away from both development programming and

political analysis not only for those directly involved in delivering relief, but equally for the rest of the development community. According to CDs in Kigali at the time, and the managers to whom they reported in headquarters in the west, INGOs' knowledge of pre-1993 Rwanda was 'displaced' in the race to respond quickly to crisis conditions.

The second reason for this loss of 'intelligence' was that in virtually all INGOs, emergency operations are run by expatriates flown in on short notice to meet relief needs. Expats coordinate with other expats to provide specialist services in water supply, distribution, health, social services, etc. These expats certainly hire large numbers of local staff, often from within the communities they are servicing. In contrast to development programs, however, these local staff are for the most part used in technical capacities, implementing programs designed by international experts. Local staff become less central in the development of programming. Little in the style of emergency response by most INGOs promotes sustained dialogue with the local community whose needs are being met. Relief programmes are usually pre-conceived and pre-packaged, often literally so. This allows relief agencies to respond quickly and efficiently to crisis which break at undetermined times in unspecified places, and clearly help save many lives. It does, however, have the drawback of tending to distance the INGO from the lives and politics of the communities in which they were operating. 1993 saw a substantial growth in the expatriate population of Kigali and a commensurate decline in the meaningful contact between INGOs and local partners and peoples. This phenomenon was less pronounced for INGOs which used their development staff in country to run their emergency operations, CARE among them, and most strikingly pronounced for those INGOs which relied on separate emergency teams flown in for the purpose.

This shift from development programming to emergency relief, with its important effects, started with the IDP crisis and escalated with the crisis provoked when Burundi refugees fled mass killings in that country in October 1993. Many of these ended up in southern Rwanda, and the shift to emergency footing in Rwanda was complete. Not only did the INGOs already present in Rwanda augment their emergency operations to deal with the influx, more INGOs arrived in the country to lend a hand, most with no experience in the region, let alone the country. The transformation of the INGO presence in Rwanda from a development oriented one with substantial contact with the local population, to one dominated by large international relief programmes run by expats, was now complete. According to many Rwandans, and a number of seasoned international observers, this shift had the character of "an invasion of the kids" - a reference to the youth and inexperience of many emergency staff.

Of course, such contact as development workers had with the local population had not helped them bridge the communication gap which existed, as noted above. Nevertheless, this contact had at least kept awareness of the issues in front of INGO staff. Had the greater resources of 1993 been combined with the more attuned mode of engagement of 1992, potentially some more of what was happening in Rwandan society may have filtered through to INGOs. A partially deaf ear tuned to a signal is better than no ear at all.

The loss of sensitivity to the local situation that the shift to emergency mode occasioned could not have come at a worse time. The months following the IDP crisis (March through October of 1993) were arguably the decisive moment in the struggle between those forces in Rwanda who sought to contain violence through negotiation and institution building, and those who sought to undermine the institutions and processes of peace with a massive escalation of violence (see Brief History of the Crisis, above.) It was at this stage that extremist forces in Kigali began to realise that they were on a losing course, both on the battlefield and around the negotiating table, and started to pay serious attention to developing a radical alternative. The groundwork for a genocide was laid at this time, right under the noses of INGOs and other international actors.

Ironically, many of the young men who later joined the forces of genocide - recruited into extremist youth militias - came from the camps which INGOs were providing with emergency relief . The experience of repeated displacement (aid workers estimated that some Rwandans had been displaced 4 or 5 times before April 1994) created deep reserves of fear and ill will among this population, as did revenge atrocities which the RPF committed at this time (Ndiaye 1993, Prunier 1995). Looking back on the experience of responding to the IDPs, a senior ICRC official lamented the lost opportunity to see into this window on what was happening in Rwanda, to perceive its scale, depth, and intensity. One can only speculate on what might have been done differently had a more sensitive ear been attuned to this population in 1993.[16]

2.2. 'THE DEVIL LEFT HELL AND CAME TO ZAIRE"[17]: INGOS RESPOND TO GOMA

From an INGO perspective, the operational heart of the Rwandan emergency was the response to the influx of over a million refugees in Goma, Zaire in July 1994. At its peak, this operation comprised over 200 INGOs, and during its first eight months cost the better part of a billion US dollars. It was without a doubt the largest, fastest, most expensive, most complex ever INGO/UN response to a humanitarian crisis.

That the genocide and renewed civil war would generate a refugee crisis was expected. Its size, timing, and location were issues which were debated among UN and INGO agencies, in an ineffectual exercise in humanitarian intelligence and crisis mapping, which left INGOs scrambling at the last minute to meet overwhelming needs. This poor performance on mapping and intelligence added to the difficulty of responding, though it makes it all the more impressive that as a group, UN agencies and INGOs managed to deliver relief supplies and services on the scale, and at the speed, that they did.

That this response took place in Zaire - itself a state which many refer to as having failed or collapsed, at least in a partial sense - was a complicating and destablising factor. Some technical aspects of operating in Zaire are considered in this episode, while the political implications are explored in the next.

2.2.1 THE INFLUX

It was 5:00 am on the morning of July 14. For days, an influx of refugees had been expected in Goma, and the tension of waiting was beginning to take its toll on the few INGOs who had assembled advance teams. Then, suddenly, out of the semi-darkness an immense wall of humanity was moving down the road from the Gisenyi border. The refugees had arrived.

By morning, an estimated 100,000 were crowded into the only open space they could find, the inner green of the traffic circle at Republic Square. By the evening, up to 500,000 refugees were in Goma; within the next day and a half the number would break the 1 million mark. Every conceivable open area in Goma town was filled with crowds of refugees. INGO workers recall the overwhelming scale of the influx, the mass of people crammed into whatever corner they could find, the make-shift latrines dug in sidewalks by 'enterprising' Goma locals, eager to make money out of the crisis as Zairians have become adept at doing. They recall people sleeping beside those latrines, playing cards next to the corpses which were starting to accumulate. Most of all, they

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[16]The ICRC, which was probably in a better position than any other agency with regards to contacts on both sides of the fight, did not play a conflict mitigation or prevention role. As a protection agency, ICRC avoids any sort of official mediation role which may threaten its independence, although in Somalia and elsewhere it has played the role of 'go-between'.

[17]Unidentified aid worker, quoted in a UNICEF Situation Report from July 31, 1994.

retain the vivid memory the sheer number of people in the streets and passageways of Goma town, making it impossible to move, turning the ten minute drive down the 4 kilometres from Goma town to the airport into a frightful 45 minute drive of honking and nudging refugees out of the way.

The dense crowding was the essential element in the general chaos which now characterised Goma town. Kevin McCort's experience was typical. McCort and two colleagues flew into Goma on July 17th, and landed just in time for an RPF shelling of the airport. Scared by the sound of the incoming mortars, they took comfort from the French soldiers who were unloading planes without worrying about the incoming shells, seemingly able to tell from the sound that they weren't close enough to worry about. After spending a tense night at the airport, staying awake to the sound of small gun fire, McCort and his colleagues drove into Goma town. The 4 kilometre trip took them 45 minutes. Angry FAR soldiers were roaming around causing havoc and enough insecurity for McCort to take the advice of the French soldiers, and wear a flack jacket. Somewhat incongruously, when they reached the Karibu Hotel, where CARE had established a temporary 'office', they found the restaurant working normally and serving quite edible food.

2.2.1.a - Cause of the Influx

What INGO workers called a "tidal wave of humanity" was caused by a breach in the last government floodgate, at Gisenyi. This last major government holdout outside of the French-held southwest, had been encircled by the RPF on July 12th, who began a mortar and shelling campaign the same day. On the 13th, the FAR fled Ruhengiri, pushing the refugees in front of them, creating for themselves a mobile human shield. Thousands of FAR soldiers crossed with the refugees. The tactic worked: when the RPF attempted to follow the FAR into Zaire, they were impeded by the sheer density of humanity along the streets of Goma.

Afterwards, some would recall the number of soldiers and their weapons, and the degree to which they appeared intact as an army, and find it hard to connect that reality with the speed of the RPF's victories. The answer lies in the nature of RPF fighting tactics, which were an adaptation of the brilliant tactics used by Museveni in the Luwero triangle in the early 1980s - where many of the RPF commanders had their guerrilla training. As a smaller, mobile force without the quantity of crew-served heavy artillery available to the FAR, the RPF avoided full-scale assaults on FAR defensive positions. Throughout the summer campaign, whether in Byumba, Kigali, or Ruhengiri, the RPF adopted the highly successful ploy of wearing down the moral and fighting spirit of the FAR by encircling their defensive positions, engaging the FAR from a distance, and forcing the FAR into a nerve-wracking game of waiting. Eventually, in Byumba and in Kigali, the FAR would attack RPF positions; but the RPF, without having to defend a particular location, would simply fall back and let the FAR expend their energy and ammunition. The RPF would then open a hole in their encirclement, allow the FAR to retreat through it, and attack them from the rear as they attempted to fall back. By Gisenyi, the FAR had learned the pattern, and had no stomach for the fight. The difference in Gisenyi was the FAR's success in driving a human barricade between their retreat and the RPF advance. This barricade was the 1.2 million refugees to which the international community as a whole was now scrambling to respond.

Critically for future developments in the crisis, the retreating FAR was for the most part allowed to cross into Zaire unchecked by the Zairian authorities. Although some units of the FAR were disarmed as they crossed, the majority were able to retreat across the border in full military formation, keeping their vehicles and weapons intact. The presence of coherent, armed units of the FAR, as well as numerous additional militia members, would have serious negative consequences for the development of the refugee crisis in later stages. These were not so noticed much initially, however, as INGOs and

others scrambled simply to respond to the overwhelming numbers, not distinguishing to whom they were giving aid.

That the Zairian army and local authorities allowed the FAR to cross into their territory unchallenged seems to support the contention that Zaire is itself a "failed state", or at the least a state on the brink of failure with weak internal administration. This analysis is not without its problems. Certainly, the Zairian central authorities have only limited capacity to control administrators and army units in the outlying regions of the country, which certainly includes Kivu province in which Goma is located. However, President Mobutu of Zaire also had limited will to attempt such control. Mobutu was a long-time ally and 'big brother' of Rwanda's President Habyarimana, and the Zairian army had been sent to support the FAR in the early days of the civil war. The points is that even if the Zairian state had the capacity to disarm the FAR as they crossed the border - and this is uncertain - it is highly questionable whether it would have chosen to do so. The central authorities in Kinshasa were happy to allow the analysis of weakness to excuse their failure to disarm the FAR - as they would be required to do under international law - but in fact this was more excuse than rationale. Until the fall of 1996, when the lack of order in Zaire as a whole has threatened the centre, President Mobutu in particular has shown himself to be adept at deploying his Presidential Guard to very powerful effect to contain such threats. Had he chosen to do so in Goma, there is no doubt that Mobutu could have done much to contain the ex-FAR and militias freedom in Goma, a freedom which they would ultimately use to divert aid supplies and intimidate and murder refugees. Thus it is less 'state failure' in the political science sense of that term that was at issue, and more the deliberate failure of a state to fulfill its international obligations that allowed the creation of the untenable situation of a large 'refugee warrior community' inside and surrounding the UN's camps in Zaire.

2.2.2 MAPPING AND INTELLIGENCE: PRE-PLANNING FOR GOMA

Despite the fact that the refugees were expected in Goma, agencies were left scrambling when they did arrive. The reason is a two-fold failure in mapping the developments of the crisis: the UN system bungled the mapping, and individual INGOs bought into the UN mapping decisions, despite the fact, in many instances, that their own intelligence and mapping systems contradicted that of the UN. Also, there were a series of local failures to communicate advance warning of refugee movements to key INGO actors on site.

2.2.2.a - UN system mapping and planning

Some of the details of a long and sordid story of the UN humanitarian system's mapping exercise in Rwanda are given in JEval, III,118. It amounts to this: two contingency planning and mapping exercises were conducted, which contradicted each other. One was reasonably accurate but was buried by the system; the other was disseminated in the system, but was wholly unrealistic. In brief, the UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO), created when the genocide started in April 1994, led a contingency planning and mapping exercise through May and June. This process, which had input from the UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and other agencies, produced three scenarios: best case, a cease-fire which produced no refugees; worst case, a collapse of the Burundi/Rwanda border with Zaire in the form of an extension of the civil war and mass refugee flows; and a likely case scenario which estimated a total of 1.5 million refugees flowing into the Goma and Bukavu regions of Zaire - an underestimation by a few hundred thousand of the actual figures, but a reasonable planning estimate. This contingency plan had been prompted by a highly accurate analysis by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) about the displaced population being pushed west by RPF advances.

Two things waylaid this contingency plan. First, it ran into political trouble at the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Geneva and New York, when officials there

argued that the plan would draw attention and coherence away from other efforts within the UN system to generate support for relief operations, particularly a Consolidated Appeal process at that time being undertaken by the combined UN humanitarian agencies. Second, it was released (at a meeting in Nairobi) on the same day on which France's *Operation Turquoise* was announced. Not only did that announcement draw attention away from the plan, the prospect of French intervention seemed to alter the political calculus which drove the planning figures in the first place. As a result, UNREO's 1.5 million figure was not widely disseminated among the humanitarian community, and certainly did not reach INGOs in any official way.

Simultaneous with this process, UNHCR began a separate planning and mapping process, which adopted the figure of 50,000 as the planning figure for the Goma area. According to various sources, this figure was not intended so much as a estimate of the expected influx as a politically derived figure calculated to be high enough to generate pre-planning and interest, low enough not to frighten away Zairian cooperation, which was necessary for pre-planning and might well be have been lost by the adoption of the somewhat staggering 1.5 million figure. Whatever the rationale - which is not in the remit of this report to evaluate - the fact is that the figure of 50,000 refugees for Goma was the figure used internally by the UNHCR and disseminated, at least orally, to INGOs seeking guidance in their own pre-planning.

2.2.2.b - INGO's own mapping experience

For the most part, INGOs did not participate in the planning exercises either of UNREO or the UNHCR, although they were informed of its results in a desultory way. In itself, this seems a waste of resources and information. INGOs were conducting their own mapping and intelligence exercises, and these could usefully have been added into the mix of information generated by the UN system. In the end, INGOs mapping exercises were no more successful than those of the UN, but reconstructing the exercise as far as is possible, it would appear that the INGOs' exercises were ineffective *because* of the UN system. A pattern emerges in exploring INGO mapping, which is that those responsible for the mapping do a reasonably good job at identifying the broad features of the developing and moving crisis, and then that identification gets lost somewhere inside the INGOs' own planning system as other people within the INGO respond to official figures from the UN system.

CARE Canada is a case in point. Executive Director John Watson led a reconnaissance mission to the region at the end of May, 1994, and sent a prescient report to CARE Kenya, which was leading CARE Canada's operations in the region. Watson argued that "we are facing a major crisis as the RPF carries its offensive from east to west...", and noted that the displaced population in the southwest was three times what it was in RPF zone. The numbers, he argued, "speak for themselves" and "let no one be surprised if we see large movements into Zaire" in the upcoming months. Shortly thereafter, with the encouragement of UNHCR, they requested funds from the agency to preposition supplies in Goma, a request to which UNHCR did not respond.

It appears to be at this time that Watson's original assessment of the likely development of the emergency was lost in CARE Canada's own planning system. A contingency plan for intervention in Goma, dated June 13th 1994, called for preparations for 60,000 refugees, while noting that the real figure could be between "50,000 and 100,000", a figure based on discussions with the UNHCR office in Goma. Watson's early estimate, which was lower than but in the same range of scale as UNREO's, would have been a far more appropriate planning figure. As an organisation, however, CARE had little option but to buy into UNHCR's figure, for it was to UNHCR itself that CARE had to turn for financial support in budgeting and planning.

Other INGOs had similar experiences. MSF pre-stocked medical supplies in Goma, but within 24 hours of the influx had to send for further supplies, having significantly

underestimated the numbers and needs. OXFAM had also propositioned supplies, based on their own mapping and intelligence efforts. OXFAM actually already had a sub-office in Goma, dating back to before the genocide, and had increased the capacity of that sub-office to handle a displaced persons crisis in north Kivu, in October 1993, and again to deal with Tutsi refugees fleeing the genocide in May and June. From that point on, OXFAM stocked additional supplies in Goma, fearing a increase in the case load. Late in the game, reconnaissance trips by members of their Emergencies Management Team had also identified 500,000 IDPs on the move in the region, still an underestimate but again significantly more realistic than the 50,000 figure. However, that intelligence did not make it to the key personnel in Goma: days before the influx, OXFAM's water engineer in Goma was pulled out of Zaire, leaving them with supplies but no appropriate personnel. OXFAM was able quickly to recover from what in the end was only a hiccup, but it did delay their initial response to the influx.

Looked at as a whole, the mapping and contingency planning exercise for Goma was a mess. INGOs role in that mess was a relatively small one. Excluded from formal contingency planning processes, their own estimates did not lead to independent action because of the need to operate through the very UN agencies whose flawed planning processes were the source of the initial problem.

What is also notable about both INGO and UN mapping exercises is that the issue of the FAR and the extremist militias crossing into Zaire with the refugees was given much attention. This is not to say that no one was aware of the issue, rather than nothing in the pre-planning process for Goma gave any consideration to the political and security problems that would be posed the presence of large numbers of soldiers among the refugee population. The implications of this can be seen below in the third episode examined.

On the 8th of July, French army helicopters in western Rwanda confirmed large scale population movements. An UNREO report distributed among UN agencies and some INGOs - but by no means all the INGOs involved in relief operations - stated that "unless immediate action [is taken], humanitarian situation might become a major disaster in the very near future. Food, medical assistance, shelter, etc, are urgently needed." This was a significant understatement.

2.2.3 THE FIRST CRITICAL DAYS IN GOMA

Limited pre-planning left humanitarian agencies scrambling to respond when the refugees arrived. Some camp sites had been identified, but these were wholly insufficient for the number of people now facing imminent disaster if water and food supplies, and health services, were not immediately available. Even those INGOs who had pre-positioned supplies and personnel in Goma were drastically under-supplied when faced with the reality of the scale of the influx. The scramble for Goma was on.

On July 14th, both the International Medical Corps (IMC) and CARE Canada received large grants to begin emergency services. IMC received $700,000 from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide emergency medical services. CARE's grant was actually from a proposal drawn up before the influx; in light of the changed realities, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the donor, quickly responded to CARE's request to shift the funding into emergency response to the influx. On July 15th, when the refugee population in Goma reached 1 million, the ICRC and WPF exchanged a series of faxes which launched an airlift of 1500 tonnes of food from Nairobi to Goma, and WFP drew on a UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) loan of $5 million to purchase more stocks. On the same day, MSF - which already had a some communications capacity set up in Goma - sent a Situation Report (SitRep) to Brussels which approved a plan for Goma operations the same day, giving MSF(H) the coordinating role among the various MSF country branches. The speed of MSF's response is recalled with a mixture of admiration and envy by other

INGOs: by the next day, an MSF logistician and two doctors arrived in Goma to open a medical dispensary.

The next days were crucial. A team of CARE experts arrived from Ottawa; MSF opened its second dispensary at Monigi, just out of Goma; a WFP rapid response team was deployed in Goma, and the agency began reallocating food stocks from other regional programs to start meeting Goma's needs; UNICEF reached operational status and began opening special camps for unaccompanied children; and then on July 19th, the Rwanda-Zaire border closed. On July 20th, with the influx now presumably over, given the closed border, key decisions were made as to the distribution of responsibilities. The management of three major camps was decided by UNHCR, giving CARE responsibility for Katale camp; the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) the lead in Kibumba; and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) co-responsibility with the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) for Mugunga camp, which would turn out to be the camp where most of the soldiers and militia members who had implemented the genocide would go to seek refuge. By July 21st, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) had provided funds for a US army airlift of ICRC emergency supplies - Volvo trucks and trailers as well as medical supplies. By the end of that same day, key tasks had been assigned to the INGOs who were first on the scene. In Katale camp, CARE's management function also saw them building the camp infrastructure; OXFAM was tasked to cope with the water situation; MSF was assigned to health, and on sanitation MSF and UNICEF were to work together. In Kibumba, the IFRC took responsibility for building the camp and distributing food, while CARE here provided management and distribution of non-food items; OXFAM was again on water, MSF on health (and nutrition), and UNICEF on sanitation. In Mugunga, MdM provided emergency health services and IFRC was on camp management, while the other agencies played the same roles. Just as vital as operations in the camps were the operations which 'fed' them: the channeling of refugees from Goma to the camps, which was done in a cooperative effort by IOM, GOAL, and the local Zairian Boy Scouts; central stock management (in warehouses being established in Goma town), which fell to CARE; and transport, which CARE shared with WFP.

A final, critical, responsibility fell to Caritas, which received support from the French Army. This was collecting and burying the bodies which by now were littering Goma town and the roads to the camps. One person recalled doing a quick head count on the 56 kilometre drive between Goma and Katale, and estimating the number of bodies at over 5,000. Ralph Hazelton, who was sent in by CARE Canada to launch and manage their Zaire operations, remembers that bodies were often simply left on the road where they had fallen, and so densely crowded were the roadsides that there was no choice but simply to run over the dead bodies. Some of these bodies were eventually rolled up into makeshift shrouds by other refugees, and left in a heap by the side of the road. If INGO and UN staff were going to be able to start providing supplies in camps along the roads which led out of Goma, the bodies had to be cleared away and buried. Other INGOs, including OXFAM, participated in this task at various points.

The division of responsibilities was complicated by the number of INGOs - many of them organisations with no previous experience in relief operations - that began flooding into Goma shortly after the influx. At the height of the Goma operations, this number would peak around 250. Attempting to contact some of these organisations one year later, many were found not to have any address or known contact point, still more no longer were in existence.[18] Here was a second instance when the weak administration that characterises eastern Zaire played an important role. Under normal circumstances, INGOs responding to an emergency inside a country are required to register with that country's government, which controls the number of agencies

[18]This was the experience of JEval Study III's efforts to collect financial data on NGO activities in Goma. See JEval, III, --.

involved and monitors their access, at least to a certain extent. This was not the case in Zaire. Whether INGOs were able to gain access to Zaire by paying off Kinshasa authorities or whether simply no controls were put on this flood of INGOs, is not clear. What is clear is that responding to the humanitarian consequences of one state collapse from inside another had its challenges!

2.2.3.i - BUILDING A PIPELINE FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES

The sense of chaotic urgency was not confined to Goma. In Nairobi, where many INGOs had regional offices or quickly established them, and in various western headquarters, regional directors, emergency support unit leaders, country directors and logistics coordinators were also scrambling to open a pipeline of people and supplies to meet the extraordinary needs. Running these pipelines often fell to country directors in adjacent countries, principally Kenya. Clea O'Reilly, for example, was in Kenya managing CONCERN's development programs as well as their programs for Somali refugees in north Kenya. That program was just beginning to wind down, and ECHO had agreed to fly CONCERN's supplies to a temporary stockpile in Nairobi. By happy coincidence, then, CONCERN had a ready supply of rubhaul tents, OXFAM feeding kits, solar lamps, and high-energy biscuits. After quickly flying to Goma to assess the needs, O'Reilly immediately began to use her network of contacts, developed through nine years in the region, to open the pipeline. She began by negotiating flight clearances from UNHCR Geneva, which had established a flight control centre to manage the flotilla of planes which were beginning to arrive at Goma airport. The airport was already over capacity, as it was being used by the French army as their base for Operation Turquoise.[19] Keeping a continual supply of personnel, US cash, and supplies flowing into Goma was a seven day a week, twenty hour a day job for CONCERN's Nairobi office.

Having a base of supplies and capacity in the region proved critical for other organisations as well. CARE Kenya was able to draw on its Kenya programs to supply a flow of capable personnel to their Goma operations. CARE Kenya was running a large refugee management program in northern Kenya, on the Somali border, and began pulling people off of this project to send to Goma. Having a reservoir of experienced Kenyans made all the difference to CARE's capacity to respond in a timely way to the Goma influx.

For all INGOs, a key problem was how to pay for supplies, accommodation, and local staff in Zaire. Getting enough foreign currency into Zaire was a big problem. The condition of Zairian state authority was such that there was no proper system for international banking or currency transfers in Goma. Most INGOs had to resort to sending large amounts of US cash into Goma with their personnel. Mindful of the UN's experience in Somalia, where they had worked, CONCERN ensured that one of the first items sent into Goma was a large safe! (This was not always adequate protection - one INGO had their entire safe stolen out of a camp in Bukavu.) Sneaking large amounts of cash past the Zairian customs authorities caused many an INGO worker to break out into a cold sweat, and on occasion some of this cash was stolen. For the most part, however, this system worked without cost, other than to the nerves of INGO personnel.

A second problem was finding qualified staff. All the major INGOs had already drawn on their core emergency teams and reserve lists to respond in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and inside Rwanda itself. Now the net had to be cast wider. This has two deleterious implications. First was the need to drain staff away from development projects in other parts of the world, which had long-term negative consequences for those projects still very much being felt today. Second was in some instances the necessity of hiring less than fully qualified staff. This problem was made more or less difficult by two factors. One was size: the larger INGOs simply had wider contacts, more established profiles, and

[19]Overnight, local authorities in Goma had raised landing fees at the airport from $800 to $2500.

better recruiting systems, and were more quickly able to identify appropriate, even if inexperienced personnel, than were smaller or less established INGOs. Second was specialisation: those INGOs which concentrated on sharply defined technical areas which had commercial counterparts - such as medicine, communications, or water engineering - were able to draw on qualified private sector personnel, even if many of these had no experience in humanitarian work.

2.2.3.ii DECIDING TO GO TO GOMA

For some agencies, it was not immediately obvious that they should go to Goma. A case in point is Save the Children Fund (SCF) U.K. At their office in Nairobi, the regional director Robert ffolkes examined the situation and concluded that SCF should not form part of the Goma response. In ffolkes' assessment, SCF had no spare emergency capacity, after having responded to Ngara and other aspects of the crisis; it had no francophone staff on whom to draw, nor even a mechanism for recruiting new francophones; and the number of other INGOs racing to Goma was such that arguably SCF's contribution was unnecessary. The pressures to go were enormous: not only was their the scale of the humanitarian need, there was the public relations pressure to be seen to be doing something in this huge crisis, and the potential organisational rewards of being involved in a high profile emergency. ffolkes resisted these pressures, and SCF's London headquarters backed his recommendation.

It was an unpopular decision. A number of SCF employees - including David Shearer who would later head SCF's response inside Rwanda - felt then and feel now that SCF should have been in Goma. The reasons are two: there is, of course, the basic humanitarian reason that the needs were high and SCF could have made a contribution; the second is that the organisational rewards, in profile and money, to organisations who did respond, were so high that SCF was perceived to be foolish to miss out on them.

ffolkes was not the only regional director to have doubts about going. Jude Rand, who became CARE's regional support person to the Kenya CD, and de facto regional leader, expressed misgivings about CARE's capacity to respond to Goma. As had other agencies, CARE had already fielded staff and resources to RPF held Rwanda; to the Ngara region; to Burundi; and to Zone Turquoise. Did CARE still have extra capacity to cope with Goma? Rand's concerns were balanced in three ways: first, by the belief that the scale of humanitarian need dictated that CARE should be involved; second, by an assessment that French was not essential for all staff; and finally by a determination that if CARE launched programs in Goma, donors would find the resources to support them.

2.2.3.iii CHOLERA

By July 24th - a mere ten days after the first refugees crossed the border - the major INGOs, UN agencies, and systems were in place. Nevertheless, the situation remained desperate. On July 22nd, a UNICEF Situation Report stated that "hospitals are over capacity so most people are just dying where they've established a bit of space."

In some sectors, particularly water, the situation was somewhat better. At Katale camp, for example, OXFAM had quickly established a water system using the good natural water supply of the site. The site had a river flowing into it from a nearby volcano, but most of the water disappeared into the porous lava rock. According to OXFAM's water specialist for the camp, it was a reasonably straightforward task to redirect the water 200 metres into OXFAM tanks designed for the purpose, chlorinate it (it was already clean, having been thoroughly filtered by the lava) and siphon it into taps. The water collection point was then fenced off to avoid pollution. Within three days, this system was providing the refugees with three litres per person per day, enough to meet minimum survival needs. By their own, and by external assessment, OXFAM's water delivery was superb, far more efficient than that supplied by the US Army in Goma

(JEval,III,--), which brought in equipment which produced mineral water quality water, but for a very limited number of people.

That the water situation was dealt with quickly proved a blessing, when by mid July the situation took a sharp turn for the worse again with the outbreak of a cholera epidemic. The first case of cholera was reported on July 17th, and MSF quickly established cholera treatment centres. Five days later, the number of reported cases was in the thousands, and the situation looked critical. The Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and GOAL began increasing efforts to provide adequate water, which was in less supply in Kibumba particularly than in Katale or in Goma town itself. The UNHCR asked MSF to take control of the water situation in Kibumba, and the agency decided, until OXFAM could install large capacity systems, to truck water along the Goma-Kibumba road which was still dense with moving refugees.

Kibumba was arguably the worst of the selected sites, covered as it was in hard volcanic rock and lacking a natural source of water (on UNHCR's site identification, see JEval, III,xx). One INGO worker described seeing it first on July 20th, with roughly 100 shelters; four days later it had grown to 7km by 3km, and every inch of space was covered by shelters. The closest water source was 25km up the road, and each family was sending their strongest member there each day to fetch water. Often these did not return, and even when they did, the amount of water they could carry was barely adequate for the needs of a family.

The assessment of the Humanitarian Aid study of the Joint Evaluation is that the spread of cholera in Goma could have been slowed - and thus the morbidity rate lowered - by better pre-planning in Goma (JEval, III, 75.) This report can add nothing to that careful and comprehensive assessment, based as it was on a huge volume of data collected from UN agencies, INGOs, and independent medical resource centres such as the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta. What is worth highlighting, though, the cholera epidemic more than the influx itself sparked a flood of INGOs to the camps which did not help the situation. Notorious cases such as CARE-Germany flying doctors in on a two week rotational basis are only part of the story. Stories abound of inexperienced INGO personnel incorrectly treating cholera victims, as well as of well-meaning and eager, but under qualified INGOs shipping in inappropriate supplies which other INGOs were burdened with managing. The flood of unknown and inexperienced INGOs to the emergency, with its attendant problems, may be an issue INGOs themselves have to find some way to regulate to forestall a tarnishing of images of professional INGOs operating according to high standards.

2.2.4 Distribution & Registration

Once the cholera epidemic had been contained, attention turned to the proper organisation of the camps, distribution of food and non-food aid, and provision of appropriate social services. In a conventional refugee situation (if there is such a thing), a central aspect of solidifying these systems would be to conduct a registration exercise to determine precise numbers in the camps and map out the beneficiary population and their needs (including identifying unattached women, unaccompanied children, the number of elderly, the gender divide, etc). One of the things that this allows relief agencies to do, as well, is organise a proper system of distribution according to the needs of the most vulnerable.

There are many potential such systems, but the evolution of INGO best practice has determined that where possible, existing political structures should be used to organise distribution. This has a number of advantages, including supporting existing cultural values and political systems among an otherwise dislocated population, and a degree of efficiency which stems from the political structures inherent knowledge of the beneficiary population. Organising alternative distribution systems, it is argued, simply attempts to replicate a system of knowledge and organisation which already exists. In

Somalia and elsewhere, UNHCR, WFP, and INGOs involved in camp management such as CARE and CONCERN, has developed this best practice to a high degree.

When the Rwandan refugees fled into Goma in their masses (and Bukavu and elsewhere as well), there was, in the estimation of both INGO and UN workers on the ground, neither time nor resources to conduct any sort of registration process. Where it was attempted, it proved very difficult. The following excerpt from Mark Richardon's diary, taken from a day at Hongo camp, south of Goma, is illustrative:

> CARE had been told not to register any refugees until UNHCR told us to do so, but we began anyway at noon because the 5000 people there were restless. It went so slowly that soon everyone grew fed up and began jumping and pushing through the string. People were pushing and pressing everywhere, overrunning our tables and ready to take our 1400 plastic sheets. Personally, I was calm and not in the least scared because I figured the worst that could happen was they would overrun us, we'd evacuate our dozen people in trucks, and they'd take all the plastic sheeting. In hindsight, I think that was naive, and I believe now they would have beaten us or even killed us given the opportunity. Later, I learned one man had taken a grenade from his pocket, ready to throw, but been persuaded by his friends to put it back. My God! We were about ready to flee out of there when Chris [Alwood, of CARE Canada] jumped on a table and, screaming in French, told the crowd we would deal only through the heads of the prefectures. The crowd settled, 11 chiefs turned up, and Chris went off up the hill for a very public huddle. It was eventually agreed that we would distribute an equal number of plastic sheets to each prefecture, through their chiefs. This worked very well.
> What a country! What a life!"

This experience was repeated throughout the Goma region. With no chance to conduct registration exercises, humanitarian workers relied on existing political systems to distribute relief supplies. The implications of doing so would soon become clear, and are explored in the next 'episode.'

2.2.5 ADDITIONAL ISSUES IN GOMA

A few more points should be made about the Goma influx before moving on. These points share the common theme that they are either unconventional features of a refugee emergency response which were present in high measure in Goma, or features which while not unconventional in historical terms nevertheless fall outside of INGOs' standard conception of what they do and who they do it for.

2.2.5.a - Military Humanitarians

The first was the presence of a large number of 'military humanitarians', as they became known. In Goma, during the first months of the crisis, no less than four different western armies deployed troops to support humanitarian operations. Operation Turquoise focused its efforts inside southwest Rwanda (Zone Turquoise), but also frequently lent what spare capacity it had to INGO and UN efforts to cope with Goma. Shortly after the influx, the United States sent a large contingent of soldiers, comprising Operation Support Hope, to assist in the delivery of relief supplies. Smaller contingents were sent by the Dutch, the Israelis, and the Irish, though the Irish army deployed its troops not as a military unit but as staff support for INGOs. The Japanese sent a small contingent to Goma from October to December. Relations between INGOs and military personnel were often difficult. INGO personnel working in the water sector in particular voiced their frustration with Operation Support Hope, which according to them was slower and more cumbersome in delivering essentially similar - and sometimes less appropriate and more expensive - relief services than the INGOs themselves were capable of providing. In particular, the US military's insistence on keeping all its heavy

equipment at base headquarters every night - which involved moving the equipment up and down the slow road between Goma and the camps, with an armed escort - drove INGO personnel to distraction, given that they were operating in the same conditions but without security. Irish INGOs also report problematic relations with the Irish army personnel sent out to support their operations, and one senior Irish INGO worker admitted that given the choice they would not suggest a repeat performance of the attempt at cooperation. On the other hand, the military contingents provided a level of organisational capacity which was far beyond that of the average INGO; were able to deploy heavy machinery that INGOs could not get into the region; and undertook a number of tasks which some INGOs refused to accept - notably, the French army did much of the work of clearing corpses after the cholera epidemic. An UNREO officer wrote to a colleague to say that the presence of the French army in Goma "has saved uncountable numbers of lives. Whatever capacity the UN had here when all hell broke loose was definitely inadequate, and if it were not for the French..."

2.2.5.b - Trauma

The second feature of the Goma influx which stands out was the extraordinarily high degree of trauma, among the refugee population and among relief workers - indeed, among anyone and everyone involved in coping with or responding to the genocide in any fashion. Clearly, all refugee situations are traumatic: the experiencing of being forced to flee a home, especially from the threat or fear of violence, is surely among the most traumatic a person can experience. In the Rwanda case, however, this level of trauma was enormously magnified by the scale of the trauma from which the refugees were fleeing. Of course, Hutu refugees in Zaire were not for the most part victims of genocidal attacks. But genocide is not a question simply of a large number of individual attacks strong together: it is a form of extraordinary social convulsion in which the leadership of a society as a whole attempts to wipe out a population which, until the genocide begins, is not an enemy or a foreigner, but a part of the society itself. As Randolph Kent, former head of UNREO, and others have argued, the ultimate victim of a genocide is society itself. Among the refugees in Goma, quite apart from those who participated in the killing program, were either chose or were forced to support the genocide, by identifying neighbours, providing names to militias, providing material to the army, and other means. Even among those who had not participated in the genocide in any direct sense, there was a profound sense of fear and guilt: if genocide is an attack not an individuals but on a social group, then the guilt for conducting the genocide can easily be placed on the social group from which come the leaders of the genocide. The guilt or innocence of individual persons in the refugee camp is a juridical question beyond the competence of this report, but it is unquestionably the case that the vast majority of the refugees in Goma were profoundly traumatised by the experience.

That level of trauma is transmitted beyond the immediate participants in the event. The vast majority of diplomats, UN personnel, journalists and INGO staff who came in contact with genocide in any but the most cursory form suffered from a degree of trauma, in some cases from acute trauma. Seasoned aid workers who had lived through Somalia, Iraq, Sudan and other emergencies without failing to cope, broke down in the face of the level of misery in Goma painted as it was against the backdrop of the extraordinary atrocity of the genocide. Charles Petrie (UNREO) talked about the crisis as "madness, more than madness, worse than bestial perversion"; CARE Canada's Ralph Hazelton recalls spending the first few days in Goma simply reacting to the situation and then, from a balcony overlooking Goma, crying uncontrollably at the passively savage degradation of human life. Two years after the fact, every aid worker interviewed for this report had stories they still could still feel the effects of the crisis on their own lives: many spent a number of months following their involvement in some form of psychological healing process; a large number became alienated from families; all have stories they still cannot bring themselves to tell.

The trauma had a direct impact on INGO operations. First, many INGO personnel who were inside Rwanda at the time of the start of the genocide - and who might, in other circumstances, have been expected to join emergency teams in Goma and elsewhere - were so deeply traumatised by what they saw, what they were unable to stop from happening to friends and colleagues and the society in which they worked, that they were unable to provide any reliable input into their own agencies' planning for the subsequent stages of response. Second, staff in the field were put under extraordinary strain by the combination of the trauma and the normally exorbitant working conditions of emergency operations. The scale of the crisis drove many to work well beyond their own physical capacity, to the point that at one stage in early August a WFP employee tasked with organising transportation for personnel complained that he was overburdened by medical evacuations of UN and INGO staffers. More to the point, a number of INGO head office staff admitted that at various stages they had to question, and in some instances reject, the judgment of even experienced field staff who appeared to have lost perspective among the scale of the tragedy.

INGOs did make some efforts to deal with the situation. A number of INGOs sent trauma counselors or psychiatrists to the field to assess the stability of their staff, or help them cope with the situation. For the most part this was not successful. A form of aid workers' *machismo* emerged, and along with it a deeply black humour - both probably critical defense mechanisms under the circumstances. Most INGO workers were dismissive of the efforts of psychiatrists or trauma counselors to assess the impact of what they taunted were far worse conditions than the psychiatrists had ever coped with (though that is hardly the point.) CONCERN's staff in Goma were put off by the whole idea, played games with a counselor sent out from Dublin: at a counseling session, each staff member present one by one pulled out a knife and stroked the blade with their thumbs, seemingly oblivious to what they were doing. The counselor left shortly thereafter. More successful were counselors who simply talked to team leaders or regional coordinators and gave them tools for identifying when their own staff members were displaying signs of no longer coping adequately.

2.2.5.c. - The press

The counsellors were outnumbered by journalists. With the influx into Goma, and in particular with the outbreak of cholera, newspaper and television news cameras flooded into the already overcrowded facilities of Goma. Some mention has been made already of the symbiotic relationship which emerged between journalists and the press officers INGOs designated to deal with them. Like all symbiotic partnerships, the relationship was simultaneously close and draining. Many journalists camped out on the floors of the already cramped quarters of INGO staff, and shared everything from rides to evening meals. Yet journalists and INGOs were in some senses on opposing sides of the story, with press officers feeling that journalists were only trying to cover the most sensational aspects of the story, while journalists would complain that the press officers were shielding aspects of what was going on. Mark Richardson, CARE Canada's press officer in Goma, described his job as that of a "jackal herder."

2.2.5.d - Presence of soldier and militia members among the refugees

Finally, and most importantly, a striking feature of the situation in Goma was the large number of former FAR soldiers and militia members among the refugee population. These henchmen of the genocide had, as noted above, been allowed into Zaire by a combination low capacity and willful neglect. A further problem were Zairian soldiers from the Goma region, ostensibly deployed to provide security for the refugee camps, in fact amplifying the generalised chaos of the initial stages, and for a considerable time adding to the security problems in the camps by harassing, robbing, and occasionally beating refugees.

Rwandan soldiers and militia members were admitted to refugee camps without discrimination by UN agencies and INGOs. Although eventually a large percentage of the ex-FAR among the refugees separated themselves out from the general population and encamped themselves in Mugunga, some 40 kilometres west of Goma, many stayed mixed in with the general refugee population as did nearly all militia members. As combatants, these men (and some women) were not legitimate refugees, and had no entitlement to aid or relief supplies. Nevertheless, they received it, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly by melting into the general population - easy enough if you're a militia member, with no uniform and only a machete as a weapon - and then diverting the delivery of relief supplies through a process of intimidation of other refugees within the camps. They also received relief supplies directly, however: Caritas and Lutheran World Federation (LWF), among other agencies, directly supplied Mugunga camp - comprised almost entirely of soldiers - with emergency relief supplies. This aid was given on the basis of the argument that if the soldiers were not given a share of the supplies, they would simply steal the supplies from deserving refugees. This was no doubt the case, as even when they were being supplied theft and diversion of other relief supplies occurred frequently.

Clearly, combatants - and in particular people who had implemented a genocide - should never have received either relief supplies or the protection of international law and the UN that comes with being treated as a *de facto* refugee. That it occurred has had a tremendously negative impact on the long-term, ongoing Rwandan conflict. Relief supplies given to or siphoned off by the soldiers, militias, and leadership of the former regime were quickly put into rehabilitating the rump of the Habyarimana regime, and in particular their armed capacity.

The question is, however, what options were open to INGOs. Ideally, Zaire should have disarmed the FAR and the militias as they crossed the border. Failing that, Zaire should at least have provided sufficient security to the refugee camps such that INGOs would not have to have supplied Mugunga camp out of fear of raiding. Zaire did neither. In the circumstances, it is hard to see how INGOs could have separated the combatants from the broader population, or screened refugees, either effectively or safely. The people in question had more than proved their willingness and capacity to kill in huge numbers if their political aims were thwarted or even challenged. The presumption must be that any *effective* effort by the humanitarian community to screen their access to aid supplies would have been met with violent resistance - as indeed it was on a number of small occasions. To have attempted to engage in a screening process without military backing would have been extremely risky, not just for INGOs but for the refugees themselves. In the event, INGOs did not try, but instead adopted the pose of neutral humanitarianism which has long been their modus vivendi, and supplied relief to all present, irrespective of combatant status. The operational and political implications of all of this form the subject of the next episode.

2.3 - POLITICS AND WAR IN KATALE CAMP: REFUGEES RESPOND TO THE INGOS

Concentrating on the technical aspects of relief delivery in the initial months in Goma paid its reward in a relatively quick stabilization of the delivery system in the camps. Once the immediate needs were met, however, disturbing political realities came to the fore and the security situation rapidly deteriorated. INGOs realized that they were facing a situation in which the remnants of the Habyarimana regime were controlling delivery of relief supplies inside the camps, and diverting a large share of those supplies to rebuilding themselves as an armed force. Having responded to the refugee influx in a mode developed through the paradigm of neutral humanitarianism, INGOs found themselves in the decidedly non-neutral position of facilitating a renewal of the genocidal regime. Their efforts to respond politically to the situation succeeded in raising public awareness of the dilemmas which they faced, but were ineffective in terms

of their contribution to ongoing negotiations within the UN system on how to tackle the problems the INGOs were facing. A failure to coordinate their efforts with those of the UNHCR and the UN Secretariat squandered what was otherwise a principled and potentially effective coordinated response in October and November of 1994.

2.3.1 THE SECURITY SITUATION

After the initial chaotic month, the situation in Goma appeared to have stabilized somewhat. The end of the cholera outbreak (roughly in the middle of August) saw a decline in morbidity and mortality rates (JEval, III,). The movement of refugees from Rwanda and between camps was reduced to a small flow. Most of the refugees who would come to Goma were there, and were placed in camps with access to basic food, health, and water provisions.

Through August, September and October, the essential humanitarian tasks of identifying resources, building a pipeline to transport those resources to the beneficiaries, and distributing the resources - food, water, health supplies and medical treatment, social services - within the beneficiary population, were at the level of contained crisis, as distinct from the earlier pandemonium. However, with the departure of both the US and French troops, the security situation in the refugee camps and in the region in general began to deteriorate. The situation was already bad before the American and French troops left. The following discursive account of one months worth of serious, reported security incidents reveals the extent to which even with a number of neutral military contingents present, the situation was highly charged.

- On August 8th, ex-FAR forces killed the Zairian staff of an American missionary in Goma. The same day, a refugee shot dead a Zairian soldier who was directing traffic in the camps.
- On August 9th, ex-FAR elements in Kibumba camp beat to death a Rwandan refugee who was encouraging others to return to Rwanda.
- On the 11th, a Zairian soldier killed a Goma money changer, setting of protests in Goma town.
- Two days later, two people suspected of working for the RPF were beaten to death by ex-FAR troops in Mugunga camps.
- On the 16th, a gang of refugees attacked a food distribution post in Kibumba camp and threatened staff of the IFRC. Later that day, a Zairian soldier attempted to steal a refugee's car, and in the ensuing shuffle Zairian forces opened fire on the camp, killing 2 and injuring 4 others.
- Local volunteers of ADRA were severely beaten during an ADRA-Caritas food distribution exercise on the 17th, and the same day, further hampering the process of controlled distribution, ex-FAR forces stole ID bracelets from the HCR's registration pack.
- On August 18th, an expatriate staffer of the CDC was ambushed by 6 Zairian soldiers on his way home from a camp, where earlier on two refugees had been killed in a disagreement over food distribution.
- On August 22nd, two INGOs - MdM/F and MdM/Sp - had their vehicles stolen and chauffeurs beaten by ex-FAR men in Mugunga camp.
- A voluntary repatriation exercise attempted by the UNHCR on August 24th was violently disrupted by suspected *Interahamwe* militia youth with the support of local Zairian forces; one Rwandan was savagely beaten, and the *Interahamwe* also attacked clearly marked UN vehicles.
- On the 26th, UNHCR had to call on support from a locally deployed Israeli army company (sent to Goma to provide support to emergency medical operations), when stones were thrown into a CARE staff house. The same evening, a UNHCR car was stopped by six masked Zairian soldiers, and its occupants harassed.
- On the 27th, refugees in Kituko were murdered after encouraging others to repatriate, and the Dutch INGO Memina had their radios stolen from their compound.

• On the 28th, in Kitko camp, a man suspected of being affiliated to the RPF was set upon by a crowd and beaten to death.
• The 29th saw two MSF workers robbed by masked men carrying a grenade, and a female refugee hacked to death by a mob who overheard her telling other refugees that the conditions for repatriation in Rwanda were good.
• The month ended with the Zairian soldiers - who had been hired to provide security at the airport - looting the US camp after the last troops departed from the airport.[20]

Though they had clearly done little to directly control the level of violence in the camps and the region, it does appear that the presence of the American and particularly French armies on the ground diminished somewhat the capacity of the rump of the Habyarimana regime to use the refugee camps as a staging ground for its own rehabilitation. With the departure of the armies, however, the process got well underway. The security situation continued to unravel. The following, taken from a USAID report on the situation dated September 4th, conveys the essence:

> Security in Goma town and the refugee camps has significantly deteriorated during the past month to the point that some INGOs are reconsidering their support of activities in the refugee camps. Several factors contribute to the insecurity in Goma and the region, including the general collapse in law and order in Zaire; internal Zairian political dissent; the uncertain existing relationship between the Zairian and Rwandan government; the increasing availability or arms and small weaponry in the region. Within the refugee camps, a number of factors contribute to the insecurity, such as the ongoing campaign of intimidation aimed at preventing refugees from repatriating; the overcrowded, poor camp layout, and a lack of crowd control that is intensified by the lack of an evacuation plan; camp mob and gang problems and the lack of law and order; and undisciplined and corrupt Zairian military elements.

When five MdM staffers were held hostage by Zairians on the 7th of October, it seemed the situation had bottomed out. It was to get worse.

2.3.1.a - FAR and militia control over relief resources.

As illustrated above, the scale of the influx into Goma had made it impossible to conduct any sort of initial registration. The UNHCR and their camp management partners relied on the existing leadership structures to distribute food and non-food aid in the camps. The problem with this, of course, was that the existing leaders of the refugee camps were the men and women who had justified, planned, and executed the Rwandan genocide.

This leadership group - members of the Habyarimana regime, including many local administrators, clerics, and other authorities, plus the defeated forces of the FAR, and the members of the extremist militias, especially the *Interahamwe* - had quite deliberately stoked fears of the likelihood of a revenge genocide by the RPF to encourage the Hutu population of Rwanda to flee to refugee camps in the face of the RPF's advance. They were now using the refugee population as a human shield, both in the sense that the refugee movement had blocked the RPF from following them across the Zairian border and dealing them a debilitating defeat, and in the sense that the refugee camps provided this leadership - which we can refer to in short hand as *les genocidiares* - the ideal setting within which to attempt a rehabilitation of their power. This involved both controlling the refugee population, especially to ensure that they did not return home, and thus that relief supplies kept flowing to Goma, and diverting those

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[20] List of incidents compiled from USAID daily situation reports, UNREO (Goma) situation reports, and other sources.

relief supplies in order to rebuild their armed capacity. In both of these aims, the UN and INGOs in Goma were unwilling facilitators.

As documented above, a large number of ex-FAR troops and militias had established a separate camp in Mugunga, roughly -- km west of Goma, and the senior leadership of the Habyarimana regime, both civilian and military, were concentrated in nearby Lac Vert camp. But it was not only in these camps that *les genocidiares* controlled the refugee populations. By September it was increasingly clear that several things were happening. First, *les genocidiares* were able to block any process of voluntary return by continued intimidation of refugees, including by beating and murdering anyone who voiced a pro-repatriation sentiment. Other, slightly less obvious tactics were used to instill fear in the population. Witchhunts, a feature of village life in parts of Rwanda, were initiated in the camps by camp leaders, with the apparent aim - and certainly the effect - of cowing the refugee population into submissiveness. Second, this leadership was for the most part able to control the distribution of food and non-food aid in the camps, which meant both that few resources were reaching the most vulnerable, and that *les genocidiares* were siphoning off a substantial portion of the resources, putting them into feeding soldiers, and selling food to local Zairians, including Zairian soldiers, and using the money to purchase new weapons and other military equipment. One HCR officer estimated at one point that *les genocidiares* were getting anywhere from 30% to 50% of the total resources being distributed in the camps. By early 1995, intelligence sources could confirm UN estimates that a 'new' army of roughly 50,000 troops had reconstituted itself out of the old FAR, and were based in the Goma region (both in the camps near Goma, and on Isle Ijwa, in Lake Kivu.)

The control *les genocidiares* gained over the camps did not happen instantaneously in all camps. Looking back it appears that the further away from Lac Vert, the longer it took *les genocidiares* to establish control of a camp. Katale camp was furthest away from the exiled regime; the process by which *les genocidiares* took control of that camp illustrates the intensity of the political battle in which INGOs in Goma were caught up and engaged, and the limitations on their capacity to control such political situations.

2.3.2 EVACUATION FROM KATALE CAMP

In Katale camp, a very long, difficult 56 kilometres north of Goma town, CARE had been given the responsibility of managing what had become the world's largest refugee camp, with an estimated population of 270,000. In part because of the distance of the camp away from Goma - which gave agencies a chance to establish some locations and systems before the refugees arrived en mass - Katale was among the less chaotic camps in the Goma region. The OXFAM water team had managed to get a reasonable water supply flowing in the camp in just a few days and CARE had also managed reasonably quickly to control the distribution and delivery process. Thus security incidents in Katale camp were far fewer than elsewhere.

There are apparently contradictory reasons for understanding why this was so. What is clear is that the CARE team had quickly put into place a sophisticated distribution and local management structure, learned from experience in the CARE camps for Somali refugees in northern Kenya. CARE had pulled a number of their staff from the Kenya camps, and this experience was critical in being able quickly to establish a controlled system. The system had two elements: representatives from each of the 11 *prefeture* (Rwandan provincial units) liased with the INGOs to determine the nature of distribution, and in addition separate committees were established to negotiate with the INGOs on distribution, social services, women's issues, etc. It is not clear whether the *prefeture* representatives were *genocidaires*: some CARE staffers from Katale assert they were not, while other INGOs insist that at least the majority of them were indeed former regime people. In either case, however, it seems clear that in the early days, CARE's dual system enabled it to have some significant impact on distribution and other

political issues in the camp. For example, a women's representative on the distribution committee brought some problems with women's access to the attention of the committee, and changes were made in the distribution process to accommodate the problem. There was even a security committee, which raised issues of concern and liased both with the camp's INGO management and the Rwandan Boy Scout group which CARE had hired to help organise the camp. The Boy Scouts controlled access to the camp at its gates, and directed traffic within the camp. Their presence was presumed also to have a more general deterrent effect on lawlessness.[21] In one case, an incident involving Zairian soldiers had resulted in two guns being kept in the camp. CARE's camp leader, Guy Banville, halted all distributions until the guns were returned, which they were on the following day by a representative on the security committee.

In the politics of Goma, precisely this degree of control and order - even if it was partial - was a major problem for the INGOs involved. *Les genocidiares* struck back. As described by Banville, they launched a coup against the INGOs' control. It is not clear whether they had not done so earlier due to lack of capacity - perhaps the leadership had concentrated its efforts in the camps closer to Lac Vert and only now, having secured their control over those camps were moving into Katale - or because in its initial stages, the INGOs management and distribution did not interfere with their goals. An strong hypothesis is that both are true: the INGO management of the camp did not begin to interfere with *les genocidiares* goals until the social services and security committees, among others, started to have an impact, and by the time it did, the rump regime had sufficient control over the camps further south to focus its attention on gaining control over relief supplies in Katale camp. Certainly, when they launched their 'coup', it was well planned, closely coordinated, and highly effective.

On the afternoon of Wednesday, September --, a representative of the security committee reported an increase in banditry in the camp, and stated that the Boy Scouts appeared to have lost control of the situation. On the following day, the leader of the bandits was found dead in the camp, and the killing blamed on the Boy Scouts. A group of militia members among the refugees started roving through the camps looking for Boy Scouts, ready for a fight. Some militia members began to threaten expat INGO workers. A decision was taken to withdraw to Rutshuru, where most of the INGOs working in Katale had their local headquarters and many aid workers had their accommodations. The following day, the situation worsened. A 'blacklist' was distributed around the camp: a Kenyan CARE employee, who ran the social services committee, was at the top of the list, and CARE's management team were also named. CARE's Goma leader, Bob Kelly, determined that the list should be taken seriously, and decided to withdraw INGO staff from the camp, and began making preparations to that effect. It was obvious in the camp that the INGOs were preparing to leave. At this stage, a refugee with whom CARE had collaborated on the management entered the CARE office and told Kelly that the INGOs had to leave. When Kelly said that they were making preparations to leave, the refugee said he did not understand: men with grenades were preparing to make a move on the CARE offices, and they had to leave *now*.

The evacuation strategy was already in place, and worked well. The decision had already been taken that the exit point would be a road towards the Uganda border some ten miles north of Rutshuru. Most of the expat workers, and many local NGO workers, evacuated by this route and went to the Uganda border. Here many of them were delayed by the lack of Ugandan visas, but this was sorted out quite quickly. After passing through Uganda to Rwanda, most were able to return to Goma, and eventually to the camp itself. (Not all of CARE's staff were able to return. Banville received a personally addressed death threat which was taken seriously by the INGO, and he was evacuated from Zaire.)

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[21] It is important to note that the regional Boy Scouts organisation differs from its western counterparts in that most of its members are in their thirties.

The evacuation did not last long, and as a result did not hugely disrupt beneficiary relief in the camp. Local staff were left behind, and kept the distribution systems in the camp flowing well. Within a week of the initial evacuation, the expatriate staff were able to return. When they did so, however, they found that 35 of the Boy Scouts had been murdered by *les genocidiares* within the camp.

The Boy Scouts were not killed randomly. Rather, the murder of the Boy Scouts was the central act in a well coordinated putsch against the INGO leadership of the camp. Details of the planning extended to having ensured the absence of three senior Zairian police officers who were in theory there to provide the camp with security. The three had told CARE they would be absent for the day, when they all had to attend the wedding of a friend. When the INGOs evacuated, faster than expected, they saw all three loitering beside the road a few miles from the camp. One later admitted they had been paid by militia leaders to absent themselves from the camp on the day of the attack. Planned, controlled, and successful: when the INGOs returned to Katale, militia members with machetes and some guns, and new boots, had replaced the Boy Scouts at the entrance to the camp, and the number of identifiable militia members within the camp had grown substantially. Though the INGOs who came back in were allowed to operate, to continue to distribute resources, it was clear from this point on that that distribution was if not directly controlled by the genocidiares then at least they were able to block any sort of distribution which went contrary to their interests.

Within two weeks, CARE decided that their position in the camp was untenable, and on October 17th, announced their intention permanently to withdraw their services from the camp. The INGOs in Katale moved to regain control over the politics of Katale.

2.3.3 WITHDRAWING FROM KATALE

As the USAID report cited above notes, the issue of withdrawing relief services from the camps, in the face of the ethical issue of feeding killers, had been raised within the INGO community as early as September. MSF had already pulled out of one camp, citing ethical issues, but MSF communications personnel privately will admit that MSF's role in the camp was in any case at an end, and that the ethical issue was not the one which determined the timing of the withdrawal.[22] Among the majority of INGOs, the issue had been raised with the UNHCR, but not acted upon. With the coup against the INGOs in Katale camp, the issue moved to the front of the agenda.

With a number of INGOs raising security and ethics question with them, UNHCR decided to hold a meeting on the issue, to which roughly 20 INGOs turned up. UNHCR explained their perspective: that under international law, they were bound to provide protection for the refugees, and that the humanitarian imperative dictated that they stay involved in the camps. However, among the INGOs who attended, the issue did not go away, and over the next few days a number of them began to discuss the possibility of a coordinated response. The idea grew, and a statement was drafted, saying that the INGO community would withdraw from the camps if the responsible members of the international community failed to act to tackle the security problems, and separate *les genocidiares* from legitimate refugees in the camps. Over five days in late November, a core group of INGOs met to negotiate a common text. INGO regional and camp leaders faxed draft copies to headquarters in Europe and North America, and a joint strategy emerged.

On the 3rd of November, MSF/B, MSF/F, MSF/H, CARE Canada, CARE Britain, CARE USA, CARE Austria, CARE Norway, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the American Rescue Committee (ARC), OXFAM/UK and Ireland, MdM/F, the Canadian --- -------- (CECI), Pharmaciens sans Frontieres Spain (PSF-Spain), and MdM-Spain issued a

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[22]Confidential interview, MSF staff member.

joint statement declaring that they would be forced to withdraw from the camps unless four conditions were met:

- the 'structures within the camps which incite violence' - [ie. *les genocidiares*] - should be separated from legitimate refugees;
- arms should be removed from the camps;
- an independent registration should be carried out with appropriate security provisions;
- the protection of refugees should be guaranteed;
- and relief agencies should be guaranteed their freedom to deliver assistance without interference from 'current power structures within the camps' - another reference to *les genocidiares*.

Although it was decided among the signatory INGOs to remove an earlier drafts' explicit call for UN military intervention, it was clear from the language of the letter, and from its call that "the United Nations and international community take immediate and decisive action" that this is what the letter intended and the INGOs were demanding. Several other INGOs who were operating in the camp decided not to sign: these included CONCERN, Assist UK, LWF, and World Vision. As late as November 1st, draft letters stated that GOAL was "keen" to sign, but ultimately they did not. UNHCR early on made it clear that it could not be publicly associated with such a letter, but privately did much to facilitate the process by which the letter was drafted, and advised the INGO press officers on appropriate release strategy.

2.3.4 IMPACT OF THE WITHDRAWAL.

The coordinated press release by the INGOs certainly received considerable attention in the western media, and brought the issues of the security and ethical situation in Goma to light in a way which it had not yet been reported in the press. In terms of 'drawing attention' to important aspects of an emergency, this was clearly quite an effective tool. However, it is questionable whether the move had any more substantive impact.

First of all, it is quite clear that the whole process had no impact on the ground in terms of altering the delivery of relief assistance to the refugees or minimising *les genocidiares* control over that process. The INGOs which did withdraw from Katale camp were replaced by others: when CARE conveyed to UNHCR its intention to withdraw relief services from Katale camp, it was already able to indicate the LWF was ready and able to replace them (this communication was roughly 10 days before the press statement was issued and the withdrawal became formal.) MSF, as noted above, had stated that it had withdrawn for ethical reasons, and no doubt these were real, but some within MSF contend that it would have withdrawn at roughly that time anyway as the need for emergency medical treatment was much diminished. What is more, those INGOs which did withdraw from Katale continued to operate in the Goma region. CARE continued to manage camp supplies from a warehouse in Goma: those supplies were distributed in Katale camp, as well as elsewhere. The actual impact on relief delivery, or the politics surrounding it, was negligible at best.

Slightly more difficult to judge is the impact of the letter on the broader discussion within the international community as to how to tackle the problem. What is clear is that there was already an ongoing dialogue between UNHCR, the Secretary General, UNAMIR, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) about the security problem, the outlines of which were not raised with INGO field staff at their meetings with the UNHCR in Goma. As early as mid-August, the UNHCR had suggested to the Secretary General and to DPKO that the situation was beyond both their scope and their mandate. DPKO began consideration of various alternatives, but UNHCR considered them to be somewhat unrealistic. Therefore, they began on their own initiative to negotiate with the Government of Zaire as to the provision of an internationally directed Zairian security force for the camps. At the end of September, UNHCR took

this proposal, which had been successfully negotiated, to the Secretary General for his support. The UNHCR was in effect told to put the program on ice while DPKO explored more robust options.

A November 18th report by DPKO made clear that the ideal goal was the separation of soldiers from refugees, but that this was a difficult goal to achieve. DPKO laid out a series of options to the Security Council, the most ambitious of which was designed to reach the ideal goal.

Option A provided by the DPKO was to send a (relatively) large number of troops under Chapter VII to separate the soldiers from the refugees and in so doing disarm them. The proposal was designed to meet the ideal goal and, significantly, its purpose was to enhance the physical protection of refugees by *removing the sources of the threat.* The report estimated that 7,000 troops well-armed troops would be required to fulfill the mission, with 4,000 devoted to the North Kivu (Goma) region and 3,000 for South Kivu (Bukavu). According to DPKO sources, the department knew full well that this option was a non-starter, that the Security Council would never consider a Chapter VII humanitarian operation so close to the disasters of Somalia. They were right: the option was dismissed in the Security Council as "a fantasy."

Option B was considerably more moderate, involving 3-5000 troops under Chapter VI in what came to be dubbed "the salami approach." The idea was to have a smaller number of troops secure a small slice of the camps and "clean" it: disarm the soldiers and leave behind a protection structure to ensure the safety of refugees after the departure of the troops. It was argued that this 'cleaning' process would require 3000 troops if only North Kivu was dealt with, and 5000 troops if both North and South Kivu regions were tackled. This option was clearly the preference of the Secretary General. This was based on a clear perception that a Chapter VI operation was easier to handle - ie. get past the Security Council - than the Chapter VII option, and that the solution it invoked required only the formal agreement of Zaire, not their operational involvement. It was this option which received further exploration, though it was eventually rejected.

DPKO also put forward a third, highly innovative option: to use a private security company to provide the protection required. DPKO received an informal proposal from a British company specialising in providing private protection (to homes, firms, etc) which outlined a solution involving this firm providing training and logistical support to Zaire's troops. The perceived attraction of the option was that it would avoid the political difficulty that had scuppered the UNAMIR option - countries not wanting to deal with the political repercussions of body-bags returning back from an operation in Zaire which their populations little understood. The proposal did receive some support in the Security Council, including from one member of the P5, as a practical solution to a difficult situation. Other states, however, rejected it both because of its high cost and on the basis of principle. Some states argued that using private security company to fulfill an international public responsibility was a shirking of that responsibility. Those who supported the option riposted that principle was fine if you were willing to act on it; otherwise, pursue practical solutions. The end result of the consideration of these various options lends credence to this practicality argument.

On November 30, the Security Council asked DPKO to continue its investigation of options. Discussions in the Council and in the corridors clearly favoured option B among the three. The US, in discussions with DPKO, expressed their support in principle for Option B, and noted that on the basis of their own assessment that the force should have as its backbone one strong, well-equipped battalion. When DPKO asked if the US was offering to supply such a battalion, they received a curt no in response, as well as a list of countries which the US felt were capable and might be willing to supply the battalion. However, at the same time, the Security Council requested that DPKO look further into the question of supporting Zaire's troops in the

provision of protection. Clearly, the Security Council was sensing the difficulties of actually establishing a peacekeeping force for the camps, and wanted to keep its options open.

A joint DPKO / UNHCR mission was sent to Rwanda to assess the appropriateness of the various suggestions made to date, and in particular option B, the "salami" option. The mission found that the task was in fact more difficult than anticipated and would require more troops - between five and seven thousand, rather than three to five - than suggested. Simultaneously, DPKO began the process of approaching states for troop contributions. Of a list of 60 states approaches to contribute troops, only one gave a positive response. The forces of the state which did respond positively did not correspond to the implicit definition of a "strong" battalion. Option B was dead before it was started.

The lack of available troops corresponded precisely to the unwillingness of the UNAMIR TCNs to send their troops into Zaire. Several factors were at work. First, Zaire was perceived as a "quagmire", into which entry would be difficult and exit both expensive and potentially bloody. Second, nobody's interests were at play, with the possible exception of the French, who had already been engaged through Operation Turquoise and were not about to re-enter the region. Finally, relatedly, there was no great power backing the operation. The conventional wisdom in New York is that to get a peacekeeping force approved, you need a great power - essentially, one of the P5 - to back the plan; this ingredient was absent in the case of the refugee camps in Zaire. Thus, although (as argued above) the Security Council had determined the presence of former army and militia members in the camps as a threat to international peace and security, and claimed juridical authority over them, they were unwilling to act to neutralize the threat these people posed both to the refugees and aid workers in Goma and to the long-term security and stability of the Great Lakes region.

With no peace-keeping option in the offing, the DPKO followed up on the second part of the Security Council's request, ie. to explore the option of providing support to the Zairian army in the provision of protection for the camps. DPKO proposed an International Police/Military Observer Group, which would marry Zairian troops with an international military/police supervisory, training, and observation function. However, this option quickly ran into a difficult obstacle: the opposition of Zaire. The reason invoked was sovereignty: although Zaire was willing to allow the Security Council to send in peacekeeping troops to Zaire, it was unwilling to have its own troops serve under other nations' military authority.

Finally, in January 1995, the Secretary General acknowledged that the efforts to find a suitable option for dealing with the situation had failed, and asked the UNHCR to unthaw the proposal it had floated in September 1994. This proposal - which became the Zairian Camp Security Operation (ZCSO) - was ultimately deployed in February 1995, a full six months after originally being proposed by the UNHCR.

The timing of these deliberations suggest that the INGOs press release on November 5th had little impact on the search for a solution within the UN Secretariat. However, there is some evidence that the INGOs' action increased awareness of the issue among governments, which translated into increased awareness at the Security Council. Ultimately, however, the Security Council was unable to muster the will to develop a robust solution, and fell back onto the solution proposed by the UNHCR weeks before the INGO press release and before DPKO began investigating options.

What remains for speculation is whether the INGO community could have had a more substantive impact had they been better informed about UNHCR's proposals. Had they lent their public voice to the implementation of the UNHCR's proposal, this might have been implemented sooner rather than the six months it actually took. Given that the Zairian Camp Security Operation had at least some positive impact when it was

deployed in February (JEval,II,), one can only speculate on the lost opportunity for an improved situation had these forces been deployed when originally conceived, which was at a period when *les genocidiares*' control over the camps, while not negligible, was certainly substantially weaker than it was by the time of deployment. It is unclear whether the INGO community was not well informed about the UNHCR proposal because of a lack of communication between UNHCR Geneva/New York and the field, or because of a lack of communication between HCR and INGOs in the field, or alternatively whether the responsibility for coordinating this sort of issue was between HCR headquarters and the various INGO headquarters in Europe and North America, and that this was where the breakdown in information and knowledge occurred. What is clear is that a coordinated stance by INGOs in the region was rather wasted by not being effectively coordinated with other ongoing political negotiations in the broader UN system.

The net effect of all of this was that INGOs and UN agencies were left to continue throughout 1994 - and into 1995 and 1996 - to provide relief supplies to camps which did not provide conditions in which those supplies could be guaranteed to be delivered to the most needy, or in which refugees could make voluntary decisions about repatriation. In November of 1996, it is clear what the implications of this were: the former regime used their control over the refugee populations and diverted relief supplies to reconstitute themselves as a military force inside Zaire, with disastrous consequences. This represents a second major failing of the response to the Rwandan genocide and humanitarian emergency: having failed to respond to the conduct of the genocide, international humanitarian response then inadvertently made possible a second round of the violence. The responsibility for this recycling of the violence, however, lies not with the UN agencies and INGOs who delivered relief on the ground into the hands of the former regime, but the Security Council and Zaire, who failed to ensure that those hands were tied. As the experience of Katale shows, INGOs were left facing a security and political situation which was beyond their capacity to tackle.

PART 3: THEMATIC CONCLUSIONS

3.1 EARLY WARNING

The story of early warning of the Rwandan genocide from international development and relief INGOs is easy to tell: there was none. This is not to say that INGOs were unaware of a generalised decline in order and security in Kigali, or were unaware of escalating atrocities in the countryside during 1992 and 1993. It is to say, however, that no INGO, international or local, development or human rights, foresaw the escalation of what was in fact a low-level civil war into one of the most intense killing episodes of the century.

INGOs were in good company in their failure to anticipate the genocide. No institution of the international community accurately predicted the unfolding of events in Rwanda. Some particularly prescient individual analysts, whose full-time job it was to interpret political developments, did better: Steve Browning of the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania correctly argued as early as 1993 that the Arusha Accords would meet large scale violent resistance in Kigali; Michel Moussali of the UNHCR predicted a bloodbath; and a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer produced a desk-analysis which drew a worst case scenario of over half a million dead. Most importantly, General Dallaire of UNAMIR relayed evidence of plans for a genocide to the UN in New York in January 1994. But as institutions - institutions whose function it is to monitor political change - neither the CIA, nor the State Department, nor any branch of the UN used these analyses to anticipate or act on what was to come.

There is, however, an argument that INGOs have advantages in the early warning game. It does not necessarily suggest that INGOs should do better than political, security and

intelligence organisations, but argues that INGOs have access to a type of information these institutions do not, which could usefully be incorporated into an early warning system. The argument runs that whereas the UN and diplomatic communities are remote from the situation on the ground, girded in capital cities and talking only to government sources, INGOs are in the field and talking to local actors, interacting with the effected communities. Most important, the theory is that INGOs can communicate with local actors in their own language, and to a certain extent from within their own culture, through links to local civil society actors. These structural features are thought to allow INGOs to 'hear' early warning signals which would not reach the ears of diplomats or UN agencies.

The Rwanda experience does not support this argument. In Rwanda, a number of local actors and community groups spoke 'good words' to INGOs in French, and simultaneously participated in the planning of the genocide in Kinyarwanda.[23] Despite the fact that they were in touch and collaborating with Rwandans throughout the society, INGOs gained no insights which gave them any form of early warning of potential or actual escalation.

Moreover, INGOs delivered relief supplies to tens of thousands of men who would later participate in the genocide militias, without learning anything about the development of that movement. In part, that experience is explained by the fact of a shift to emergency operations, with its attendant increased role for expatriates and its 'off-the-shelf' nature. If this is in fact the explanatory variable, it is an important one. Crises rarely come out of the blue, but are built up to in stages; as these stages escalate, INGOs shift increasingly into emergency operations, reducing their sensitivity to local political conditions. Rwanda suggests that as the in-country situation becomes more intense, the likelihood of INGOs being able to capture early warnings diminishes, just when it might be most critical.

Rwanda may be a special case: as a society, it is known for its secretiveness, its opacity, its exclusion of outsiders. It could well be that the structural features of INGOs can provide advantages for early warning in other situations. But Rwanda provides no evidence to support this.

3.2 FORESTALLING

Given that INGOs had no early warning of the forthcoming genocide, how could they have been expected to have attempted to forestall it? Clearly, to forestall an event, you need to have expectation of its occurrence. However, historical experience suggests that conflicts left unchecked will escalate. Thus, it is reasonable to investigate INGO activity from the perspective of efforts to forestall *potential* escalation.

There were few examples of INGOs engaging in this type of activity. Three exceptions to this were elaborated above: none had any discernible impact on the escalation of the crisis. Among international development and relief INGOs, only OXFAM's ENVD program can be said to have attempted to forestall a continuation of violence, and was a singular failure. The risk of failure is a hallmark of innovation, and OXFAM's program is singled out for criticism in this report for no reason other than that it was the *only* program to attempt to forestall an escalation of violence. UN agencies and diplomatic missions that engaged in preventive diplomacy efforts in Rwanda ultimately had no greater success than did OXFAM; that it tried at all is testimony to its progressive programming.

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[23] Kinyarwanda speakers among the NGO community were (and are) few and far between.

The difficulties that OXFAM had, however, are equally testimony to the difficulties that INGOs are likely to face in engaging in this type of programming. Working with civil society actors to prevent violence can be a risky business in situations - such as pertain in most of Africa - where civil society is far less independent than its European equivalent, and is often either an extension of the state into society, or a form of opposition in internal exile. (A superb recent example of this danger was USAID's support for a peacebuilding 'INGO' in Burundi, headed by Pierre Buyoya - now President Buyoya, after a coup in July 1996.) In Rwanda, most civil society groups and actors were either deeply implicated in the planning of the genocide or among its first victims. What is more, virtually all international INGOs (and UN agencies) had on their *own* staff men and women who were implicated in the genocide. Thus, both in terms of their own capacity and the capacity of their collaborators, INGOs were in fact in a very weak position to engage in forestalling exercises.

3.3 MAPPING AND INTELLIGENCE

Mapping the possible future developments of a political crisis - which in military terms would be called strategic projection - is one of the more difficult tasks an intelligence agency can tackle. Humanitarian agencies coping with emergency situations take on a very challenging project when they attempt to map when, where and how the humanitarian impact of a political crisis will take shape. Nevertheless, it is an essential component of the relief system, albeit one for which the responsibility is not clearly assigned.

In the case of Rwanda, a number of quite accurate intelligence and mapping exercises produced scenarios with highly accurate predictions about the nature of future developments in the civil war and reasonably accurate guestimates about the number of refugees various turns of events would produce. The most accurate by far was that of UNREO, whose figure of 1.5 million was substantially closer to the actual number of refugees who entered Goma and Bukavu than were other estimates. It is noteworthy that the impulse for UNREO's mapping exercise which resulted in this figure, and the analytical argument which underlay it, came from USAID, an agency with some access to the intelligence tools of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), especially including remote sensing. Access to that type of intelligence capacity is clearly a major advantage in attempting to map out crisis scenarios.

Other actors in the international relief system generated different pieces of information, based on reconnaissance missions and other systems of data gathering. But nobody in the humanitarian system at the time had responsibility for coordinating inputs of this type. Ultimately, UNHCR's understated planning figure for refugees was used by other agencies in the system simply because UNHCR is the refugee agency, and thus they vet most significant pre-planning or pre-positioning efforts other agencies might undertake.

In Rwanda, it seems clear that the weaknesses in the INGO community's capacity to undertake mapping and intelligence had two sources: first, their lack of access to an actual intelligence system, as opposed to simple *ad hoc* intelligence gathering; and second, their reliance on the UN to provide guidance in this realm. However, it is highly questionable whether INGOs either could or should attempt to rectify this untenable situation by developing their own independent mapping capacity. Even if INGOs had had far stronger intelligence and mapping of the crisis than they did, they would still have been locked into the UN figures, as both in terms of funding and access, most INGOs are enormously dependent on UN agencies in emergency situations. The Rwanda experience suggests that the appropriate direction for INGOs to take is to seek a more substantive role in the UN systems mapping process, and in particular to gain clear access to its results. Some steps in this direction have already been taken with the development of the Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS) at DHA.

3.4 OPERATIONAL RESPONSE

From an outsider's view, several things are notable about INGOs operational response to the Rwandan emergency. First, from a strictly technical perspective, Rwanda reveals a very significant capacity on the part of INGOs to deliver large volumes of emergency relief supplies with a minimum of notice and notwithstanding immense logistical difficulties. Second, INGOs are extremely self-critical about their own capacity, and as a result are engaged in an iterative process of self-critique and learning. Third, INGOs have only a very limited capacity to perform on the more political aspects of response - early warning, forestalling, mapping, intelligence. Moreover, whereas there is an inbuilt technical learning process in most INGOs this does not appear to apply to the political dimensions of response. This last point partially explains why INGOs found themselves in the paradoxical position of providing relief to a genocidal army in Zaire. Far more substantially, however, INGOs found themselves in that position as a result of a broad international abdication of state responsibility, both in the form of great power disengagement and in the form of state failure. These points can be substantiated in turn.

That INGOs have built up a deep resevoir of operating knowledge, experience, contacts, and access which allows for virtually immediate response is evident from the Rwandan experience. The access which INGOs gained to vulnerable populations in Rwanda, despite severely insecure conditions, was quite extraordinary. The capacity of INGOs (in cooperation with UN agencies) to overcome logistical difficulties rivals that of the military contingents sent to Goma (though clearly not in the realm of bringing in heavy equipment.) One British military officer involved in relief operations inside Rwanda said later that he had expected to have to work despite INGOs, and found that he could only do his work because of them. The experience of Goma provideds concrete evidence of that capacity. While it is certainly the case that the failure of adequate pre-planning left agencies scrambling, and arguably contributed to the death toll from cholera and dysentry in the camps, the fact of the matter is that UN agencies and INGOs were able to meet most of the needs of almost a million people *without* much advance notice.This is not to argue that pre-planning is unimportant, it is simply to note the speed and efficiency with which INGOs do respond to crises.

INGOs responded quickly and for the most part effectively, but INGOs are also very critical of their own operations. A large number of INGOs involved in Rwanda - MSF, CARE, Caritas, OXFAM, PSF to name a few - conducted evaluations of their operations which critiqued a number of aspects of the technical response, and suggested ways to improve future operations. For example, MSF's evaluation was extremely critical of their own internal cooperation (ie. between the French, Spanish, and Belgian branches of the INGO), and recommended far reaching changes to their coordination structure. This despite that fact that other INGOs refer to MSF as one of the fastest and best agencies on the ground. Other INGOs were equally critical of their Rwanda operations. The important point here is that INGOs actually incorporate these technical lessons into future operations. CONCERN, for example, had already by 1995 reorganised their emergency logistics pack in response to internal critique about its shortcomings; OXFAM's water program in Goma was as successful as it was as quickly as it was precisely because that agency has for years been engaged in an iterative process of reviewing operations and learning from internal critique.

The case is different when it comes to political learning, however. This applies less to the question of early warning and forestalling, because these are new areas for INGOs, so it is much too early to assess their learning capacity there. Rwanda suggests that this iterative learning process does not extend either to assesments of the political situations in which INGOs operate or the political impact their operations have. Take the issue of 'refugee warriors', the presence of an armed elements within a refugee camp which

attempt to control the resources in that camp. This phenomenon is a widespread one, which INGOs and UN agencies have tackled in the past. The most notable example was in Cambodia, where humanitarian agencies became entangled in providing aid to refugees on the Thailand/Cambodia border, in camps which were under the control of the Khmer Rouge. This aid was used by the Khmer Rouge to rehabilitate itself as a fighting force, a fact which prolonged the deadly conflict in Cambodia. INGOs and UN agencies went through a 'lessons learned' exercise in that case, and determined (among other things) that an early move to family-based systems of registration would have minimised the capacity of the Khmer Rouge to divert supplies. Yet nothing from that experience was used to make decisions about providing relief to refugees in Goma, despite the clear parallels between the two situations.

Thus, INGOs have demonstrated a weak capacity for political learning which contrasts with their strong capacity for technical adaptation. A fairly large number of the people involved in Rwanda, especially at senior levels, were actually involved in either UN or INGO operations in Cambodia as well. When the parallel is pointed out to them, many remember the situation and recognize its salience. Almost universally, however, they admitted that the parallel with Rwanda had not occured to them, and moreover that even had they drawn the link, nothing in existing INGO operating procedures would have allowed them to act differently.

The argument here is not that drawing the parallel to Cambodia in June of 1994 would have enabled a different operational response to Goma. The argument is rather that earlier political experiences should have been put through an iterative learning process, and adapted into operating procedures, in the same way that technical issues were and are. It is of course more difficult to adapt operating procedures to political questions, as these are arguably more various than the technical considerations, as well as less concrete. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of refugee warriors is a recurrent one, and while lessons have been *drawn* from past experiences, the experience of Rwanda suggests that INGOs have not *learned* them. Thus they must tackle the question of how to extend the excellent technical learning process that guides their operations to a political learning process that would keep them out of the quagmires of future Gomas.

3.5 POLITICS, SECURITY, AND ETHICS IN FAILED STATES

The quagmire of Goma was not of INGOs' making. It was made, rather, by the lethal combination of radical state failure of the Habyarimana regime, the deliberate effort of the fleeing regime to collapse the Rwandan in a final act of this chapter of the genocide, the failure of Zaire to act responsibily, and the failure of the Security Council to accept residual responsibility for international security in the face of this withering of state capacity in the Great Lakes region. Had the Rwandan state not turned to destroy a section of its own population; had the Security Council not failed to act to prevent the genocide; had the Habyarimana regime not deliberately provoked state collapse in Rwanda as it fled; had the Zairian state accepted responsibility for security in Goma; or had the Security Council picked up the issue where Zaire failed; had any of these transpired, INGOs would not have found themselves the targets of a coup in Katale camp. This sequence of events was far outside the mandate or capacity of INGOs to control.

Nevertheless, INGOs were placed - and placed themselves - on the front lines of the consequences of this litany of failure, collapse, and neglect. They did so from within an operating paradigm of neutral humanitarianism. The existence of a legitimate refugee population with serious humanitarian needs sufficed to send INGOs by the dozen - and eventually by the hundreds - to Goma and other locations of the Rwandan emergency. They went, for the most part, unheedful of the political context into which they were entering, and unfocused on the political and security ramifications of their response. The consequences are still being felt in the region - as this report is being finalised, the

international community appears to be gearing up to repeat the mistakes of 1994 - and will be for a long time to come.

It is easy to criticize INGOs willingness to provide aid in Goma despite the political context. Alex de Waal at African Rights and others have started to draw attention to this and other instances of the long-term political consequences of aid outweighing the short-term humanitarian good. To many, the answer is just to refuse to provide aid in situations where its long-term political consequences are uncertain. But this is too simple. There is no Alexandrian sword with which to cut through the Gordian knot of state failure and international disengagement.

The fact of the matter is that INGOs in Goma were faced with a choice between feeding a genocidal army and letting almost a million refugees suffer and probably die. Neither choice is acceptable. Nor, however, are the choices, or the conditions which create them, going to go away.

To avoid such conundrums in the future, the experience of Rwanda suggests that INGOs need to work on four tracks simultaneously. First, INGOs need to enhance their own capacity to serve as part of an early warning system in the international community. When state failure or collapse does occur, early warning - or even late warning - of the collapse will allow some time for political analysis and decisions to be factored into response strategies. Second, INGOs must continue their ongoing efforts to retool their development operations to play some role in forestalling state failure and state collapse. To be effective, this must necessarily be done in communication and preferably cooperation with other development and political agents. Third, INGOs need to further their initial efforts at playing a proactive role in political and public discourse to pressure the Security Council to accept residual responsibility for security in instances of state failure and collapse. This should go further than simply getting the Security Council to provide military support for humanitarian operations; arguably the Security Council needs to accept responsibility, when states neglect it, for creating conditions in which the provision of humanitarian aid to legitimate recipients does not entail the rehabilitation of armed movements and the recycling of violence. Finally, because the reality of post-Cold War politics is that the above three tracks are not likely to come to fruition rapidly, INGOs need to engage in the type of long-term, iterative learning process on political issues that they excel at in technical spheres. They must begin to develop - again, in cooperation with other relevant actors - some operational strategies which can minimise the extent to which humanitarian aid can be used to re-fuel a conflict when they are faced, as they will be, with Goma-style dilemmas in the future. If the crisis and response in Rwanda demonstrates one lesson clearly, it is that there is no humanitarian solutions to political failure. Thus while INGOs should further engage in the search for political solutions to state failure, they must also but prepare to meet the humanitarian consequences in a political astute way.

APPENDIX 1: THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN THE CIVIL WAR

On the 1st of October 1990 the Rwandese Patriotic Front, a political movement composed of Rwandese refugees in Uganda, launched an armed invasion into northern Rwanda. This predominantly Tutsi organisation opposed the stranglehold over Rwandan politics held by the Hutu President of the country, Juvenal Habyarimana. Most importantly, they objected to his continued refusal to grant refugees of earlier political violence in Rwanda the right to return to their country. Frustrated by the failure of diplomatic channels to further their search for a means to return to Rwanda, the RPF turned to warfare to achieve their goals.

In the language of international politics, the Rwandan civil war will be recorded as an "ethnic" war, as distinct from an ideological one. At a certain level that is of course accurate, with the largely Tutsi RPF fighting a largely Hutu regime, and with ethnicity used as an important mobilising tool for both sides. A strong distinction, however, is inappropriate. In Rwanda the power of ethnicity comes not principally from its physical or ethnographic realities - which are relatively weak - but from its malleability and susceptibility to mythologisation and manipulation - which are extremely strong. Since before the end of colonial rule, ethnicity in Rwanda has been used by competing elites as a tool to create divisions among the peasantry, mobilise political support, and legitimate their thirst for power. In short, ethnicity is the ideology of Rwandan political competition and violence.

In the 1990s, Rwanda's extremist ideologues put forward a powerful version of the mythology of Rwandan ethnicity. In the crude version of history they propagated, the Hutu were the indigenous peoples of Rwanda. The Tutsi were an foreign people who had invaded from the east and subjected the Hutu people to hundreds of years of oppressive rule. Colonial power had supported Tutsi domination until the Hutu people had overthrown the combined repression of the Belgians and Tutsi in 1959 to 1962. Hutu rule had since kept Rwanda at peace. Now, in 1990 the historic invaders (the RPF), or "foreign devils" as they were often referred to, were coming back to attempt to re-impose their domination, and once again enslave the Hutu people.

Like all good propaganda, the Hutu extremist message had a kernel of truth to it. Much of Rwanda had, during the nineteenth century, come under the authority of a central Rwandan kingdom dominated by a Tutsi clan. Under Belgian colonial rule, from 1916 to 1962, the Tutsi had been used as a comprador class to administer Belgian authority. And between 1959 and 1961, a Hutu political movement, the PARMEHUTU, had effectively overthrown the Belgian-Tutsi system of rule.

What was not entirely true was that relations between Tutsi and Hutu had long been one of oppressive domination. The existence of a central Rwandan kingdom whose courtiers were Tutsi was a reality which covered the more complex reality of a system of sub-kingships, several of which were led by Hutu kings into the twentieth century. Power in Rwandan society was as much, arguably more, a function of clans than of tribes. The dominant clans of the late nineteenth century, among them the Abeega and Abanyiginya, each contained Tutsi, Hutu (and Twa) members - although it is true that the Tutsi were the dominant tribe within these clans. Hierarchy was a function of the intersection between lineage, ethnicity, and social function.[24]

What is more, the distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi were not those normally associated with the concept of a tribe. Although there is some evidence that Tutsi and Hutu were once different social groups, by the time Europeans arrived in the mid-

[24]Moreover, according to ----------, Director of the National Museum in Butare, rule within a court was functionally divided, with authority over husbandry accorded to a Tutsi, authority over agriculture accorded to a Hutu, and authority over *war* accorded to whichever of the two was the strongest. This system was stopped by the Belgians after 1920.

nineteenth century, there were no longer any geographical boundaries between the two - which lived intermingled in Rwanda's villages and towns - nor any cultural, linguistic, or religious differences. The distinctions which remained were partial and fluid. Principal among these was social occupation: Hutu were predominantly agriculturists, while the Tutsi were predominantly pastoralists. The distinction was thus one of class or caste. A secondary distinction was ethnographic: the Tutsi were, stereotypically, a tall, slim, light-skinned, fine-featured race, while the Hutu were short, squat, dark, with squashed features. Just enough of each group conformed to these stereotypes to keep them alive, though intermarriage had long dulled the distinction. Belgium's imposition of identity cards as a means of telling the two groups apart ossified Rwandan society by solidifying the boundaries between them, which had previously been somewhat fluid (Hutus could, under certain circumstances, become Tutsi, and vice versa - which emphasizes the fact that the distinctions between the two groups were social more than they were ethnographic.) [25]

The weak realities of the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi provided rich ground for ideological manipulation. The official line of the RPF, which had a vested interest in attracting support from a wide spectrum of Habyarimana opponents, was that the distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi were so minimal as to be unimportant. To the Habyarimana regime, the distinction was central to Rwandan history: to avoid being locked once again into slavery, the Hutu people had to rally to the defense against the foreign enemy. This simplification of history into the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu had the advantage of drawing attention away from other profound divisions in modern Rwandan society, especially between Hutus from some northern provinces - which had profited under Habyarimana's regime - and Hutus from the south, who were as much marginalised under the "2nd Republic" as were Tutsis.

Writing about the similar ethnic relations in Burundi, René Lemarchand, a noted scholar of the region, has argued:

> The Hutu-Tutsi conflict is a recent phenomenon, rooted in part in the process of social change introduced by the colonial state, in part by the rapid mobilisation of ethnic identities under the pressure of electoral competition (Lemarchand 1993, 153).

The essential point on which to be clear is that while there was certainly an element of ethnic differentiation in traditional Rwandan society, this was first made rigid through Belgian rule, then made competitive in the development of modern elites, and finally violent through elite mobilisation in the pursuit or defense of power in the modern Rwandan state.

Rallying both northern and southern Hutus to the defense of "the Hutu nation" was vital to the survival of the Habyarimana government. The strategy had an important precedent: the first republic was created when Gregoire Kayibanda, at the head of a group of Hutu elites, constructed the PARMEHUTU movement around the dissatisfactions of the Hutu peasantry with Belgian-Tutsi rule. Political competition between Tutsi and Hutu elites at the end of the colonial period had turned violent, ultimately causing an exodus of Tutsis to Tanzania, Burundi, and especially Uganda.

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[25]The question of how distinguishable are the two groups continues to be a source of contention. Those who insist on the physical distinctiveness of the two groups point to the current Vice President and strong man of Rwnada, Paul Kagame, who has all of the classic features of a Tutsi. Those who reject the distinction point to various other members of the RPF leadership, whether Mazimhaka, Rutayisire, or Rusegera, none of whom conform much to the stereotype. The reality of pre-genocide Rwandan society was perhaps best expressed in a Rwandan joke, which pokes fun at wazungus (whites) incapacity to tell Africans apart, admonishing the wazungus for only being able to distinguish the ethnicity of one Rwandan in ten. We Rwandans are more perceptive, the joke asserts: we can tell three in ten.

It is in this exodus of Tutsis that we find the particular roots of the 1990 civil war (JEval,II,Ch1). The majority of members of the Rwandese Patriotic Front were descendants of the Tutsis who fled the violence of the revolution and independence struggles. Major-General Paul Kagame, who led the RPF for most of the four years of civil war, talks of his experience as a child in fleeing Rwanda with his parents, and making a home with other exiles in southern Uganda. Kagame and his contemporaries in Uganda had participated in the attempts of the generation above them to win the right of return through diplomacy. As these attempts repeatedly failed, they organised into a rebel group, and in 1990 launched their invasion.

APPENDIX 2: CIVIL SOCIETY & HUMAN RIGHTS INGOS IN PRE-GENOCIDE RWANDA

As documented in the Joint Evaluation (JEval, II, Ch.2, Sect. 2), the years leading up to the genocide saw Rwanda exposed to the scrutiny of local and international human rights INGOs, the UN human rights machinery, and western diplomatic missions in Kigali and Nairobi. The principal focus of attention was human rights abuses by the government, and to a far lesser extent the RPF.

The effort to reveal and document human rights abuses by the government focused on a series of unlawful detentions and 'disappearances' of Tutsis. In early October 1990, immediately following the RPF invasion, some 7000 Tutsis were detained in Kigali and in various northern town, essentially as hostages to be held against any further RPF advance. Throughout the next year and a half, 'disappearances' of several hundred Tutsis from regions in the north occurred roughly once every two months. These were documented by such international human rights agencies as Human Rights Watch, African Rights, and Amnesty International, drawing on a quite robust local human rights movement. Indeed, at the time it was often noted that Rwanda had a surprisingly broad spectrum of human rights agencies which were heavily involved - often with considerable risk - in tracking human rights abuses. Collaboration between the two groups followed established patterns of the local actors having a natural lead in tracking abuse and the international actors taking the lead in publicising those in the international arena and attempting to put pressure on the responsible government and relevant international actors, such as the UN.

The most significant human rights intervention came in 1992/3 in the form of a collaborative investigation conducted by a consortium of Rwandan and international human rights agencies (the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH). This produced a comprehensive document citing numerous cases of disappearances, and establishing that the abuses followed a pattern which was, in a legal sense, genocidal, and cited the relevant UN instrument for dealing with genocide, the 1948 Genocide Convention. At one level the intervention was effective, generating, inter alia, a special investigation by a UN human rights rapporteur, M. Ndiaye, who wrote a detailed, sophisticated, and damning indictment of the Rwandan government and reiterated the relevance of sections of the Genocide Convention. Were this citation of the Convention taken seriously by the broader UN machinery, it would have created a legal basis for intervention to protect the Rwandan citizenry from their own state. However, the Ndiaye report was long buried in the mechanics of the UN's human rights bureaucracy, and did nothing to raise awareness in the international community. Equally, the FIDH's report was little read outside the human rights community. Among the diplomatic corps and in the UN agencies, even acute observers of the human rights scene report never having seen the FIDH report (JEval, II, p32). Ultimately, the record of the human rights agencies in Rwanda in the pre-genocide period is of diligent, brave and consistent - but ultimately ineffective - reporting.

It should be noted that nothing in either the Ndiaye report or any others from international human rights institutions in any sense contained early warnings of the genocide that occured. At least two institutions, including Ndiaye, used the term genocide in reporting on Rwanda, but the term was cited in its legal meaning as that is defined by the UN Convention on Genocide. That convention allows the term genocide to be used any time members of an ethnic or religious group are targeted because of their membership in that group. Using the term genocide in this context does not refer to the mass killings the word connotes in public usage. Indeed, it is arguable that the fact that human rights agencies use the term in its narrow legal sense actually dilutes the impact of the term when it is needed, as it was in Rwanda in April 1994.

Looking back on Rwanda after the genocide, it is clear that part of the failure of human rights community in Rwanda stemmed from the highly political nature of 'civil society'

in Rwanda. In the Rwanda context, civil society was not what we take it to be in the industrialised west: less the non-partisan leadership of an independent citizenry than ex-officio political figures who could not be accommodated in the shrinking pockets of the state. One diplomat with wide experience in Africa visited Rwanda in late 1993, and recalled later that she had never seen such a fractious 'civil society'. Many of the new INGOs, she claimed, were often little more than extensions of political parties, and had nothing of the depth or breadth that characterised their counterparts in Kenya, to use one contrary example. Other more established INGOs which were not connected to political parties were nevertheless riven by party politics. When the genocide occured, many of the 'human rights' INGOs which made up part of the broad civil society in Rwanda proved to be part of the mechanics of genocide. Those who were not part of the genocide machine were some of its earliest victims.

APPENDIX 3: ECONOMIC CHANGE IN RWANDA IN THE 1980S

To understand the profundity of these changes, it helps to cast back to the period before these changes were underway, to the 1980s, and to recall that Rwanda was then perceived to be - and to a certain degree was - an island of relative stability and international acceptability is a surrounding sea of troubled bordering countries: Zaire in the late stages of internal decay; Uganda at only the earliest of stages of recovery from a decade of carnage; Tanzania after two decades of villagisation and national socialism had withered the resources of that country; and Burundi, which in 1988 experienced yet another bout of ethnic warfare. Rwanda had been reasonably stable since 1973, when Habyarimana took power in a bloodless coup. Until 1989, Rwanda was also one of the few countries in Africa which had managed to avoid the imposition of a Structural Adjustment Program, and was highly successful in attracting foreign aid to supplement its earnings from coffee, tea, and tourism. The nickname 'Africa's Switzerland' refereed not only to its thousand hills, but also to its reputation for peace and stability.

As later documented by an American scholar, Catherine Newbury, the appearance of calm and stability obscured profound underlying tensions (Newbury 1993). First, state-society relations within the Rwandan polity were not as they seemed; Newbury documented the fact that a series of measures taken by the government of President Habyarimana, during the 1970s, which on face value ensured equitable access to state resources for all tribes were in fact used as tools to give preferential treatment a particular segment of society: Bagogwe-clan Hutus mostly from the northern province of Ruhengiri and Byumba. This group, known as the *akazu* or 'little house', controlled the political, economic, and military reins of the state to the virtual exclusion and common detriment of other elements of Rwandan society.[26] Second, the end of the eighties brought a dramatic economic shock which revealed the narrow dependence of the Rwandan economy: the international coffee pricing agreement collapsed, with a massive negative impact on Rwanda's trade earnings, and thus also on its balance of payments and capacity to service its debt. This, in turn, necessitated the start of a World Bank Structural Adjustment Program, which produced important dislocations in Rwandan society. At the same time, Rwanda began to experience a second, less dramatic but equally important economic change: "in the late 1980s, the ratio of rural population to unit area of productive land tipped into the red; meaning, Rwanda no longer had the land availability to produce enough food for its own population and was threatened by a growing annual defecit."[27] Rwanda at the end of the 1980s was one of the poorest countries in the world, had the highest population-density in the continent, and had experienced a decade's worth of declining land-productivity. Not surprisingly, Rwanda also experienced all of the social ills associated with such circumstances, including high levels of corruption and high unemployment, especially among youths, resulting by the early 1990s in student protests and other forms of political unrest. A short rainy season in 1989 also led to wide-spread food shortages, and in some regions famine, in 1990.

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[26]For example, in 1990 members of the akazu held 80% of command positions in the FAR.

[27]CARE International in Rwanda, Report to Atlanta dated February 5 1996.